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5.1 Introduction
Beginning with the ﬁnancial crisis in Mexico in 1992, rescue packages
consisting of loan commitments from industrial countries and interna-
tional organizations have become an important ingredient in crisis man-
agement. Rescue packages are designed to limit the damage that follows ﬁ-
nancial crises by reassuring private investors, stopping runs, and limiting
contagion to other countries. The motivation for rescue packages is the be-
lief that the real costs of crises can be reduced by quick and decisive action.
Although there are plausible theoretical models of crises that suggest this is
an eﬀective policy reaction,1 there are, in our view, equally plausible mod-
els that suggest such intervention is eﬀective only under very stringent con-
ditions.
The intuition behind doubts about the eﬀectiveness of rescue packages is
the possibility that output losses are built into international credit arrange-
ments in order to preclude strategic default by debtor governments (Doo-
ley 2000a). In our view, the mechanism that generates the loss in output is
the inability of residents of the debtor to engage in domestic ﬁnancial in-
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(1999); Chari and Kehoe (1999); Fischer (1999); Giannini (1999); Rogoﬀ (1999); Chui, Ghai,
and Haldane (2000); Gavin and Powell (2000); and Ghai, Hayes, and Shin (2001).termediation while foreign debt is renegotiated. Moreover, international
credits are designed so that creditors will ﬁnd it diﬃcult to coordinate debt
restructuring following default.2 The important implication is that coordi-
nation problems among creditors are the feature of the international mon-
etary system that makes international lending possible.3
In a ﬁrst best world, creditors would be happy to “switch oﬀ” the coordi-
nation problem if it was clear that default was unavoidable and independent
of the debtor’s behavior. Following a “bad luck” default, a long recession in
the debtor country is clearly not in creditors’ collective interest. However,
we cannot imagine a contractual mechanism that would accomplish this
that does not also eliminate the credibility of creditors’ threats to impose
the penalty following a strategic default. Following strategic default, a long
recession in the debtor country is also not in creditors’ interests. If creditors
could switch oﬀ the coordination problem they would be left, following
strategic default, with the threat of shooting themselves in the foot. The un-
happy result is that creditors need to commit to punish even though the
punishment beneﬁts no one.
Can oﬃcial lending mitigate this market failure? In the next section we
show that this depends on the oﬃcial sector’s ability to act predictably and
to commit not to rescue following strategic default. Although it is quite easy
to set out a regime for oﬃcial intervention that moves us toward a ﬁrst best
equilibrium, we have serious doubts that oﬃcial lenders can, in practice, es-
tablish such a regime.
In the ﬁnal section we evaluate rescue packages in the context of an ex-
plicit model of crises. We argue that the insurance model developed in Doo-
ley (2000b) is an attractive vehicle for the analysis because it provides an ex-
planation for surges in capital inﬂows followed by sudden stops. The model
also provides a useful distinction between crisis and default. A crisis in this
model is an anticipated asset exchange that generates a transfer from the
oﬃcial sector to the private sector. A defaultis a transfer that is smaller than
expected.
As in all ﬁrst-generation crisis models, a perfect-foresight assumption
implies that default would never be observed because the crisis occurs at the
point when the oﬃcial sector’s assets are just exhausted. Clearly there is no
need to restructure remaining debt.
Uncertainty about the size of the insurance pool (bad luck) or the
debtor’s willingness to draw on and exhaust the pool (strategy) introduces
the possibility of default. Default occurs when the expected value of the
transfer exceeds the realized value at the time of crisis. In this event, some
creditors that expect to be rescued are not, and debt must be renegotiated.
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2. For an excellent analysis of the legal constraints on debt restructuring see Buchhiet and
Lee (2001).
3. Diamond and Rajan (2000) use a similar argument to explain the role of short-term debt
in sovereign crises.The intriguing implication is that bad luck includes not only events such as
crop failures that reduce the debtor country’s ability to pay but also politi-
cal events that aﬀect the debtor country’s access to, or willingness to draw
upon, oﬃcial rescue packages. Larger rescue packages almost certainly im-
ply larger forecast errors for rescue packages and, in turn, larger average
output losses following crises. Moreover, because output losses are related
to forecast errors, losses should be unrelated to fundamentals prior to the
crisis. Predictable crises generate unpredictable costs.
5.2.1 Sovereign Debt Models, Output Loss, 
and Third-Party Intervention
Bolten and Scharfstein (1996) develop a model of bargaining between the
debtors and the creditors in the context of domestic credit markets. They
distinguish between two kinds of defaults: liquidity defaults, in which the
debtor is unable to pay, and strategic defaults, in which the borrower is able
but unwilling to pay. Unless there is some penalty for default, like seizure of
the borrower’s assets, the lenders will not lend, fearing strategic defaults.
The distortion in this model is the inability to condition penalties for non-
payment on the reason for nonpayment. Bad luck defaults are observable
but not veriﬁable.
In a trivial sense, all sovereign defaults are strategic, because, unlike a
corporate debtor, countries are always solvent. However, we assume that a
sovereign’s power to tax is limited, so a solvent country can have an insol-
vent government. In this environment, bad luck and strategic defaults are
possible. Moreover, creditors’ fear of cheating on the part of the sovereign
determines the design of contracts.
The domestic credit markets diﬀer from the international credit markets
in that the lenders cannot seize the assets of the sovereign debtor. However,
by making contracts costly to renegotiate, lenders can discourage strategic
default.
Consider a three-period model with the periods being denoted by 0, 1,
and 2. For simplicity, it is assumed that the (risk-neutral) debtor’s wealth is
zero (the results hold true even if positive initial wealth is assumed) and it
needs to borrow amount Kto ﬁnance an investment project. The returns on
the investment are uncertain in period 0 but are realized in period 1. In the
ﬁrst period, investment gives a return of x in a good state and a return of 0
in the bad state. The respective probability of the two states’ occurring is
given by   and (1 –  ). After the return is realized, the debtor has to choose
between repaying the debt and defaulting. In the bad state, the debtor will
be forced to default (liquidity default), because the initial wealth is assumed
to be zero. In the good state, the debtor may pay out zero (strategic default)
or repay the amount speciﬁed in the contract denoted by Rx.
The return in period 2 depends on what happens in the ﬁrst period. The
return in period 2 is y if the debtor continues with the project after paying
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the creditors and the debtor begin. We assume that structure of the debt de-
termines the expected outcome of this negotiation. A rigid debt structure
means that negotiations fail with a high probability,  . A ﬂexible debt struc-
ture means that negotiation succeeds with a high probability and the debtor
agrees to pay to the creditor  y. For simplicity it is assumed that   1/2.4
5.2.2 Design of Contracts
An optimal debt contract is deﬁned as one that balances two eﬀects—de-
terring strategic defaults while at the same time minimizing the costs asso-
ciated with liquidity defaults. A complete contract speciﬁes payments con-
tingent on all possible states of the world. We ﬁrst outline such a contract.
It is assumed that both borrower and lender have complete information
about the state of the world, so the lender can distinguish between liquidity
and strategic defaults. The contract is speciﬁed as follows:
Debtor has to pay Rx(Rx x) when the return is xin period 1; otherwise,
there is renegotiation. These renegotiations are successful with probabil-
ity (1 –  ) and result in the creditor’s allowing a partial rollover of debt
into the second period. When the return is 0 in period 1, the probability
of a successful renegotiation is given by 1 –  0.
In period 1, the state of the world is determined. With probability  , good
state occurs and the project return is x. With possibility 1 –  , bad state oc-
curs and 0 return is realized. The debtor moves next by deciding whether to
repay or to default. In the case of a bad return, liquidity default is certain
(because we have assumed zero initial wealth). In the case of a good return,
the debtor may repay Rx out of the return x or may default and repay noth-
ing, keeping the entire return for itself.
Next, there is renegotiation. If it is successful, both parties agree to share
the third-period output. If it is unsuccessful, third-period output is zero.
The probability that renegotiation will fail can diﬀer for the strategic default
branch of the game and the liquidity default branch if there is full informa-
tion.
Given this contract, the debtors’ expected payoﬀ is given by




The lenders’ expected proﬁts must be nonnegative (assume the market in-
terest rate is zero):
(2)  Rx   (1    )(1    0)  
y
2
    K   0
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4. Endogenizing   does not signiﬁcantly alter the results of the model. The important issue
is how the second-period output sharing will be enforced rather than the relative shares of the
debtor and creditors.The payments must satisfy an incentive constraint to rule out strategic de-
faults:
(3)    
y
2
    Rx.
The optimal contract maximizes equation (1) subject to equations (2) and
(3). The results can be summarized as follows:
(4)  0   0o r1      0   1
It can be shown that optimal value of  0 is zero. This implies that renegoti-
ation is always successful in the bad state of nature.
The debtor’s expected payoﬀ could be written as
(5)  (x   y)   K
This represents the ﬁrst best solution in terms of net present value of the
project.
5.2.3 Incomplete Contracts
Because of incomplete information, lenders may not be able to distin-
guish between a strategic default and a liquidity default.
The contract may be speciﬁed as
Debtor has to pay Rxin period 1; otherwise, there is renegotiation. These
renegotiations are successful with probability (1 –  ) and result in the
creditors’ allowing a partial rollover of debt into the second period. Al-
ternatively, the renegotiations fail with probability  , and third-period
output is reduced to zero.
Given this contract, the debtor’s expected payoﬀ is given by




The lenders’ expected proﬁts should be nonnegative:
(2b)  Rx   (1    )(1    )  
y
2
    K   0
The payments must satisfy an incentive constraint to rule out strategic de-
faults:




The optimal debt contract maximizes equation (1b) subject to equations
(2b) and (3b):
The results may be summarized as follows: Value of optimum   is
given by
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which will be a feasible solution as long as   1.
The debtor’s expected payoﬀ could be written as
(5b)  x   y   K   (1    ) y
The ﬁrst three terms represent the net present value of the project, and the
last term is the expected eﬃciency loss due to sanctions arising due to con-
tractual incompleteness.
As pointed out by Bolten and Scharfstein (1996), from equation (5b) it
can be seen that an arbitrary probability of a failed renegotiation,  , is pref-
erable over designing a contract for which renegotiation always fails. The
higher the probability of success of renegotiation, the lower are the ex-
pected eﬃciency losses.
Can rescue packages ensure a ﬁrst best equilibrium? This is the question
we explore in the next section.
5.2.4 A Model of Bargaining with Three Players: 
Debtors, Creditors, and the International Monetary Fund
In terms of the model outlined above, in the presence of informational
asymmetries, there will be a bias of the debtor to default strategically. The
lenders may still lend if they can design a contract that imposes an incentive
constraint on the debtor’s behavior so that the debtor would not prefer to
default strategically. Any such contract will have a bias toward unnecessary
losses. As pointed out by Diamond (1993), the reason for this is that the
lenders ignore the part of the future return of a project that accrues only to
the debtor. This results in eﬃciency losses. Third-party intervention can be
welfare improving if it can help facilitate renegotiations regarding the shar-
ing of the third-period output while at the same time allowing the debtor to
reap these returns.
The debtor is assumed to have no initial wealth and borrows K for in-
vestment. The return in period 1 is x with a probability   and 0 with proba-
bility (1 –  ). The debtor decides whether it will repay the creditor or default.
In a bad state there is a liquidity default. If there is repayment, the debtor
earns a return of yin the second period. If there is default, the borrower and
lender may approach the IMF for resolution, which succeeds with proba-
bility  . It is assumed that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also
cannot distinguish between strategic and liquidity defaults.5 When  the
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5. Ghai, Hayes, and Shin (2001) assume that the IMF has a signal (not necessarily correct)
about the nature of default, but not the lender.debtor is a sovereign nation, there are political problems in obtaining the
correct information about the returns. The creditor as well as the IMF faces
this problem of veriﬁcation of returns. The IMF imposes a successful re-
structuring by buying the debt for y/2 and allows the debtor to retain y/2.
Thus it has enforced a fair distribution of third-period output. If the IMF
does not intervene, or if its intervention is unsuccessful, with the probabil-
ity 1 –  , then the renegotiation, as usual, fails with probability  .
Given this contract, the debtor’s expected payoﬀ is given by
(1c)  (x   y   Rx)   (1    )    
y
2




The lenders’ expected proﬁts should be nonnegative:
(2c)  Rx  (1    )    
y
2
    (1    )(1    )  
y
2
     K   0
The payments must satisfy an incentive constraint to rule out strategic de-
faults:
(3c) x   y   Rx   x    
y
2




The optimal contract maximizes equation (1c) subject to equations (2c) and
(3c).
It can be shown that the optimum value of   is
(4c)    ,
which will be a feasible solution as long as   1.
The debtor’s expected payoﬀ is
(5c)  (x   y)   K   (1    )(y )   (1    )  y
The ﬁrst three terms represent the net present value of the project. The
fourth term is the expected eﬃciency loss due to contractual incomplete-
ness. The intervention of the IMF can reduce the ineﬃciencies only if  was
not set at its optimal level.
If the IMF has information about the state of nature superior to that of
the creditor, rescue packages are always welfare improving. It is easy to
demonstrate in terms of the ﬁrst model that if the IMF could distinguish be-
tween strategic and liquidity defaults then the ﬁrst best solution could be
easily reached. The incentive to default strategically would be reduced if
the true nature of the debtor were revealed. There would be no sanctions in
the bad state and the output loss would be eliminated.
  y   (1    ) 
y
2
    K
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We start our analysis of output losses with our understanding of the con-
ventional wisdom. In a series of important papers, Calvo (1998) and Calvo
and Reinhart (2000) have argued that recent crises have generated relatively
large output losses for two reasons. First, they argue that for emerging mar-
kets the magnitude of capital ﬂow reversals has increased over time. Sudden
stops of capital inﬂows require sudden improvements in the current ac-
count balance. They argue persuasively that it is diﬃcult to imagine how
such a dramatic change in real transfers can be accomplished without a
short-run decline in output. These eﬀects are more severe if the country
faces quantitative restrictions on borrowing following the crisis. Moreover,
they argue that emerging markets have become more vulnerable to reversals
of capital ﬂows and associated changes in relative prices (nominal exchange
rate depreciation), because of dollarization of liabilities.
Calvo and Reinhardt, and many others, argue that ﬁnancial crises in the
1990s are best understood in the context of second-generation models of
crises that focus on multiple equilibria. Such models suggest that crises are
triggered by shifts in private expectations that are unpredictable. It follows
that an unanticipated shock to ﬁnancial markets can have economically im-
portant real eﬀects. In this section we develop quite a diﬀerent model of
crises.
In the context of multiple equilibria models, it is quite sensible to evalu-
ate government intervention as a way to reduce or eliminate the coordina-
tion failures among creditors that generate unnecessary output losses. For
example, using an open economy version of a Diamond-Dybvig bank run
model, Chui, Ghai, and Haldane (2000) provide a framework for evaluat-
ing crisis avoidance policies. In particular, increasing liquidity (including
rescue packages) relative to debt reduces the probability of both funda-
mentals and belief-driven crises and signiﬁcantly improves welfare.
The insurance model presented in Dooley (2000b) suggests that the tim-
ing of crises and the scale of capital inﬂows leading up to a crisis are the an-
ticipated outcome of private investors’ incentives to exploit a pool of gov-
ernment insurance. The insurance model deﬁnes the crisis as a reversal of
private capital ﬂows, what Calvo and Reinhart call a sudden stop. However,
the reversal is not triggered by a change in expectations. Observed crises are
anticipated asset exchanges designed to exploit government insurance.
The insurance/sovereign risk framework has two potential advantages
over second-generation models in accounting for output losses. In any con-
sistent accounting framework, the impact eﬀect on output of a crisis is re-
lated to the size of the swing in private capital inﬂows and the associated
swing in the current account balance. However, although alternative mod-
els that we are aware of take the initial vulnerability of the country as ex-
ogenous, the insurance model suggests that the increase in the scale of cap-
132 Michael P. Dooley and Sujata Vermaital inﬂows and anticipated reversals is related to growth in the availability
of insurance. Even if residents of the emerging market know that a crisis is
likely in the future, they will be willing to borrow at rates that are subsidized
by the expected insurance. Moreover, they will be tempted to consume now,
when real interest rates are low, so that part of the capital inﬂow supports a
current account deﬁcit.
It follows that capital inﬂows generated by insurance will distort real con-
sumption and production decisions before the crisis and that these distor-
tions will have to be reversed following the crisis. In this regard, our expla-
nation for the initial output loss is identical to that suggested by Calvo and
Reinhart. However, it also follows that the initial output losses following
crises have grown as bailout packages have grown.
The insurance/sovereign risk analysis oﬀers an explanation for the very
diﬀerent patterns and intensities of output losses that have followed crises.
The initial downturns in economic activity following recent crises in Asia
have been quite similar. However, the cumulative loss in output has been,
and is projected to be, much larger in Indonesia than in Korea. Moreover,
the duration and cumulative size of output losses following the 1982 debt
crisis were much larger than those of recent crises in Asia.
In our model the duration of recession depends on whether or not the an-
ticipated crisis was also an unanticipated default. An insurance crisis is
simply an asset exchange between the government and private investors. A
default occurs when the government is unwilling or unable to provide the
expected insurance payments. Because the IMF and creditor governments
are important sources of insurance, forecast errors for their intervention at
the time of crisis are crucial in determining whether default occurs and, in
turn, the real eﬀects of the crisis.
Thus, liquidity and rescue packages are important, a result consistent
with a variety of econometric work. However, the empirical measure of de-
fault is the diﬀerence between the expected and realized demand for and
supply of insurance at the time of the crisis. Because this is a forecast error,
it is unpredictable and is likely to have unpredictable real eﬀects.
5.3.2 The Initial Decline in Output
The loss in output following default reﬂects several factors. Clearly the
model suggests that, following any crisis, private capital inﬂows will fall to
zero, and, if the debtor country was using capital inﬂows to ﬁnance net im-
ports, there will have to be an immediate and probably costly real transfer
to nonresidents. Because the government will often decide to devalue in
order to help facilitate the needed real transfer, several other channels for
contraction of output will also come into play. If the government does not
devalue, the same transfer must be made, but now it will have to be ac-
complished by changes in domestic incomes and prices (Cespédes, Chang,
and Velasco 2000). Table 5.1shows a simple regression of the loss in output
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year before the crisis and the year following the crisis. The results provide a
solid baseline in that the real adjustment in the external balance generates
a severe initial downturn in economic activity. From here we can evaluate
the additional eﬀects that might be associated with ﬁnancial variables and
default.
5.3.3 Output and Default
To test the idea that output losses are related to default we must ﬁrst mea-
sure the gap between expected and realized values for the insurance pool
and for claims on that pool at points in time at which crises have been ob-
served. We have quite a small set of observations of crises that might be use-
ful in evaluating these conjectures. Unlike other empirical work on crises,
ours has a single variable, a quite clear measure of when a crisis occurs, and
a less clear measure of how long it lasts. The onset of a crisis is the point in
time at which private investors begin to exchange claims on residents of the
debtor country for international assets. The exchange, however, might
stretch over several years as liabilities mature.
The primary source of uncertainty concerning the stock of insured assets,
that is, the demand for insurance, is that the government will determine
which assets are to be protected at the time of the exchange. This will, in
turn, reﬂect the ability of diﬀerent classes of creditors to disrupt output in
the event of default. Because the government will determine relative places
in line, information from one crisis is of limited help in anticipating the out-
come in the next crisis. The model suggests that ex ante rates of return
should be systematically related to the expected seniority for exchange.
Diﬀerent types of external liabilities have had clearly diﬀerent returns
preceding crises, and this makes our story plausible. If crises are antici-
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1980s crises dummy 1.13
(0.50)




F-test for combined signiﬁcance (probability) 0.07
Note: Dependent variable: output cost for the ﬁrst year following crisis (difference from po-
tential output).Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.pated, the anticipated stock of insurance at the time of crisis should be re-
lated to the stock and structure of private claims on the country at the time
of crisis. To test this idea we regress the stock of insurance observed at the
beginning of nineteen crises against the stock and composition of external
debt outstanding at that time. The results, reported in table 5.2, provide
some support for the model. Each category of external debt can be inter-
preted as a demand for insurance. As anticipated, portfolio investment
seems to be insured relative to equity and direct investment. However, the
negative relationship between short-term claims and the demand for insur-
ance is clearly inconsistent with the model.
5.3.4 Supply of Insurance
The anticipated stock of insurance, however, is quite diﬃcult to measure
directly. Although the stocks of international reserves seem to be a pre-
dictable source of insurance, investors can never be sure that the govern-
ment will exchange all these assets. The usual assumption that the govern-
ment will exhaust its reserves is not consistent with the data. Moreover,
published reserve stocks have often turned out to be much larger than net
reserves because of forward exchange and other derivative commitments
undertaken before the crisis.
Another important source of uncertainty about the stock of insurance is
that, in many cases, a quantitatively important share of the anticipated in-
surance pool comes from new loans by creditor governments and interna-
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1980s crises dummy 3,605.46
(0.44)












F-test for combined signiﬁcance (probability) 0.00
Note: Dependent variable: rescue package following crisis.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.tional organizations. At the time of crisis it is likely that a rescue package is
assembled that consists of loans from several sources. It follows that in-
vestors must evaluate the expected net increase in credit from all oﬃcial
sources for several years into the future. Put another way, they must guess
whether the debtor government will be willing and able to borrow from the
IMF and other oﬃcial lenders to pay them oﬀ when their claims mature.
For crises after 1990, we assume that announced rescue packages are an
unbiased estimate of the resources investors expect to receive from the gov-
ernment. A problem with this interpretation is that rescue packages are sel-
dom followed by oﬃcial credits of similar magnitude. This has led many ob-
servers to doubt the importance of insurance for creditor behavior. Our
view is that announced rescue packages are important because they oblige
the oﬃcial sector to lend if alternative adjustment measures do not provide
the funds needed to liquidate private debt as it matures. In practice, the
single largest alternative source of funds has been the current account sur-
plus that has followed most crises. Thus, we view the package as creditor
governments’ commitment to underwrite an adjustment eﬀort.
The 1982 crises present a more diﬃcult conceptual problem. Rescue
packages announced in 1982 were limited to bridge loans that were very
small and very short-term. Dooley (1995) argues that commercial banks ex-
pected their own governments to bail them out and that the bailout eventu-
ally came, but much more slowly than expected. If we consider the whole
crisis period from 1982 to 1989 we see that oﬃcial credits were eventually
quite substantial. One hypothesis is that in 1982 private investors had the
amount of the bailout right but were surprised by the very slow disburse-
ment. Our working hypothesis is that the expected package in 1982 was
equal to the present value of the oﬃcial capital ﬂows actually observed
through 1989. It follows that at the time of the crises in the early 1980s it was
likely that investors were surprised by the announcement that the present
value of the rescue package was almost nil. As time passed and governments
provided loans to debtor countries, the initial default was reversed.
Investors must guess about the ability and willingness of the government
to use its assets and lines of credit at the time of crisis. Table 5.3 reports the
results of a regression of measured insurance pools previously discussed
against easily observed characteristics of the debtor country. By using the
whole sample we are assuming investors used information they did not
have, but with only twenty-six observations, alternative approaches are not
feasible. The results reported in table 5.3 suggest that the gross domestic
product (GDP) of the debtor country is by far the dominant determinant of
the size of rescue packages.
5.3.5 Measuring the Forecast Error
The model suggests that a crisis observation occurs when the expected de-
mand for insurance is just equal to the expected supply. It follows that we can
136 Michael P. Dooley and Sujata Vermaexamine the forecast error associated with the demand and supply for insur-
ance for each crisis. Suppose we observe a crisis at time t0. Our theory sug-
gests that at t0 the expected demand for reserves was equal to the expected
supply. However, because both demand and supply are estimated with error,
it is quite possible that our estimates of demand and supply will not be equal
when crises are observed. There are many potential sources for such errors.
If the demand curve was correct, an insurance pool less than the estimated
demand would imply a positive default. If the supply curve was correct, an
insurance pool greater than estimated supply would imply no default. Be-
cause we do not know which relationship is more likely to be correct, we take
the sum of the supply and demand error as our measure of default.
Our model suggests that, other things being equal, the default generated
by the shortfall of insurance will interfere with ﬁnancial intermediation as
long as the default persists. We should expect to see a larger initial decline
in output and a relatively slow recovery following a crisis that involves de-
fault relative to a crisis in which insurance is equal to or greater than its ex-
pected value.
The regression in table 5.4 is the same as in table 5.1 except that the in-
surance forecast error is added. As discussed above, the swing in the current
account is the most important determinant of the initial decline in output.
However, the forecast error for insurance is also positively correlated with
the output loss. The regression coeﬃcient is small relative to its standard er-
ror, but, given the diﬃculty in measuring the demand for and supply of in-
surance, it may not be surprising that this relationship is not precisely esti-
mated.
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1980s crises dummy –14,662.71
(–1.94)
GDP at year of crisis 0.07***
(2.69)
Foreign exchange reserves (t – 1) –0.02
(–0.50)




F-test for combined signiﬁcance (probability) 0.00
Note: Dependent variable: rescue package following crisis (RESCUE2).
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.138 Michael P. Dooley and Sujata Verma




1980s crises dummy 0.87
(0.32)






F-test for combined signiﬁcance (probability) 0.18
Note: Dependent variable: output cost for ﬁrst year following crisis. Numbers in parentheses
are t-statistics.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.












F-test for combined signiﬁcance (probability) 0.88
Note:Dependent variable: output cost for four years following crisis. Numbers in parentheses
are t-statistics.
Table 5.5 reports the results for a regression of cumulative output losses
against the swing in the current account and the forecast errors for insur-
ance. The swing in the current account loses much of its explanatory power,
a result consistent with the idea that for a given transfer quick adjustment
probably shortens the duration of the output loss. In contrast, the insurance
forecast error is little changed: it remains positive but small relative to its
standard error.
5.4 Concluding Remarks
Financial crises have important real costs, and identifying policies that
could reduce these costs is a priority. In this paper we argue that predictionsfor the eﬀects of third-party interventions are quite sensitive to models of
sovereign debt. In particular, if concern about strategic default is central to
the design of international debt contracts, and we cannot imagine that it is
not, intervention by the oﬃcial sector in negotiations between sovereign
debtors and their private creditors is problematic. Our analysis suggests
that anticipated and unconditional lending at the time of crisis is rational to
avoid the costs of default that are built into contracts. However, the expec-
tation that insurance will be provided subsidizes capital inﬂows that pre-
cede crises and, in turn, intensiﬁes the current account reversals and output
losses that follow. Moreover, uncertainty about the size and distribution of




• Output cost for ﬁrst year—diﬀerence from potential output measured
as the average over the 5 preceding years (source: International Finan-
cial Statistics [IFS]).
• Rescue package—data for 1982 debt-crisis countries is cumulative
ﬂows (Net Flows/Oﬃcial Creditors) for 1982–90 from the World
Bank’s World Debt Tables 1989–90. Other data from Dooley (2000).
• Output cost for four years following crisis—cumulative output loss
over the four years following the crisis as a fraction of the precrisis
year’s output (source: IFS).
RHS
• Bond stocks outstanding—gross portfolio bonds (source: DRS).
• Equity—estimate of stock of portfolio equity (source: Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti)
• Foreign direct investment (FDI)—estimate of stock of inward direct
investment (cumulative ﬂow adjusted for relative price variations;
source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti).
•F orecast error—the demand error minus the supply error in the rescue
package estimation equations.
• Foreign exchange reserves—at precrisis year (source: IFS).
• GDP—at year of crisis (source: IFS).
• Openness—sum imports and exports over GDP (source: IFS).
• Private loans—stock (source: World Economic Organization).
• Reversal of current account—change in the current account from the
precrisis year to the year following the crisis (source: IFS).
• Short-term debt—stock (source: DRS).
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1982: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela
1994: Mexico
1997: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand
1998: Argentina, Brazil, Turkey
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Comment Andrew Powell
Michael P. Dooley and Sujata Verma have written a truly fascinating paper
(henceforth referred to as DV), which contains many interesting ideas and
which is a valuable contribution to the spawning literature on “private-
sector involvement” and the role of the private sector, governments, and the
multilaterals in crises. In fact, there are really two papers. First, there is a
theoretical part that outlines a role for a third party (the International Mon-
etary Fund [IMF]) in a model with the possibility of both liquidity and
strategic default. Second, there is an empirical part that attempts to test the
“insurance view” of crises following Dooley (2000) and earlier papers by
Calvo, Krugman, and McKinnon and Pill, among others.
The theoretical part of the paper develops a speciﬁc model of sovereign
debt in which there is an information asymmetry in that if the debtor de-
faults the lender does not know if the default was for liquidity (ability to
pay) or “strategic” (willingness to pay) reasons. The approach is taken from
Bolton and Sharfstein (1999), hereafter BS. The BS approach has the
tremendous advantages of simplicity and tractability, and DV achieve in-
teresting results very quickly. However, in the application of the BS model
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Aires, Argentina.to the case of sovereign debt, there do appear to be a couple of issues worth
discussing.
In BS, lenders can liquidate a defaulting corporate, and there is some
probability of obtaining the residual value of the ﬁrm’s assets (let us refer to
this probability as  ). Dooley and Verma suggest that in the case of default
lenders can sanction borrowers, and the residual value of the ﬁrm’s assets is
analogous to the market value of restructured debt. In the text, DV refer to
the BS probability ( ) as the restructured value of the debt (  in the latter’s
model). In the equations, however, they appear to use   as a probability.
Perhaps they have in mind that   is the probability that debt is restructured
in some way after a failed negotiation, and S is then the utility of that out-
come, including whatever was the market level of restructured debt. With
this interpretation, the (1 –  )–type terms in the equations make more sense.
(These comments refer to an earlier draft, and the authors have taken up
this suggestion.)
Another issue is that if borrowers are to avoid sanctions then there is
some negotiation procedure, and they simply share half of the project’s out-
put with lenders (  1/2), and sanctions are lifted. However, surely  is also
endogenous. Suppose the failed negotiations imply a 20 percent write-down
of the debt. Why would borrowers share a penny more of output than ab-
solutely necessary to make lenders better oﬀ, given that alternative? In other
words, it looks like  should be speciﬁcally linked to the write-down value of
the debt. (The authors claim in footnote two that endogenizing a does not
significantly alter the results. However, equation 4 shows clearly the opti-
mum b, and hence the expected efﬁciency loss of equation 5b depends on a.)
These comments raise a more general issue as to whether the BS ap-
proach is really applicable in the international debt markets. The Incentive
Compatibility constraint is designed to rule out “strategic defaults,” but in
an important sense all sovereign defaults are strategic. One view might be
that default occurs when the present value of future output, net of debt re-
payments with a high debt level (and possibly higher interest rates), is less
than that with a lower debt level achieved through a debt reduction and net
of the short-run costs of that reduction due to trade or ﬁnancing disrup-
tions. A second approach can take place when revenues have fallen so much
that it becomes politically more costly to continue to service the debt than
to seek some type of renegotiation. These, then, are examples of strategic
defaults, although they may occur when the ability to pay has also been re-
duced substantially.
Let me now turn to the role of the IMF. Dooley and Verma focus on one
potential and hitherto ignored role of the IMF in the literature, namely, as
an enforcer of contracts. In essence, in the event of default, the IMF says
with probability   that the second-period output should be shared ﬁfty-
ﬁfty. In terms of the model, this adds some extra probability to the default
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to contractual incompleteness. It is interesting that there is an optimal value
of  , or, in other words, it appears to be optimal for the IMF to intervene
unpredictably. In a further addition to the model, the authors claim that in
a world where contracts are supported by reputation contracts and not
“gunboat” diplomacy, then the role of the IMF as the enforcer of contracts
may be redundant.
I have one doubt regarding the basic result, which, in fact, stems from
Dooley (2000)! Making the ex post resolution more eﬃcient and in partic-
ular less costly for the borrower will surely reduce the amount of debt that
can be supported in this model. In the model, rearranging the incentive
constraint (eq. [3]) shows that Rx must be less than something to do with
the returns of the project and the ineﬃciencies due to contractual incom-
pleteness. In the model it appears that K, y, and R are all exogenous, but if
R is set such that the IC is just met, K   R, and y(K), then it looks to me that
there may be a trade-oﬀ for borrowers. On the one hand, the introduction
of the IMF reduces the ineﬃciencies of the contractual incompleteness, but
on the other hand it reduces the amount of debt and hence the potential
project returns. (The authors have now taken up this suggestion and ﬁnd
that the credit ceiling depends on IMF intervention in an interesting way as
illustrated in equation 6c.)
The IMF obviously plays multiple roles, and a second role, hinted at in
the paper, is that of addressing the information asymmetry directly—in
other words, considering the IMF not as a contract enforcer but as an au-
ditor. This is the focus of a recent paper by Gay, Hayes, and Shin (2000). In
this paper, there is a very similar trade-oﬀ to that just described, which is
their reference to the IMF as “whistle blower” versus the IMF as “ﬁreman.”
In their setup, the IMF is generally bad for lenders, because the ﬁreman re-
duces the ex post cost of resolution and hence reduces the stock of debt that
can be supported in equilibrium—following Dooley (2000)—and this un-
ambiguously reduces lenders’ welfare. However, for borrowers the IMF
may be a net beneﬁt, because improving the information available to lenders
reduces the ineﬃciency of the information asymmetry, and this can out-
weigh the costs of the lower level of debt.
Gay, Hayes, and Shin (2000) also consider an IMF that acts unpre-
dictably (in a manner they refer to as “case-by-case”), but in their setup they
conclude that this will make lenders better oﬀ and may make borrowers
worse oﬀ relative to the regime in which the IMF follows a speciﬁc policy
rule. It is in eﬀect an intermediate model between a no-IMF model and the
full-IMF model. This contrasts with the DV result in which having an un-
predictable IMF as enforcer may actually be the optimal policy. Of course,
the IMF is doing diﬀerent things in the two cases, so perhaps this is not too
surprising.
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ditor. Speciﬁcally, the IMF also provides money or promises of money. This
role can protect borrowers against coordination problems between lenders.
If the IMF oﬀers standby arrangements, then this may prevent costly self-
fulﬁlling-type runs. This is the approach taken by Gavin and Powell (1999).
However, the price for such liquidity protection may be moral hazard, thus
allowing borrowers or lenders to take greater risks, actually making more
fundamental-type runs more likely. Gavin and Powell argue that private
sector standbys (contingent facilities) might also provide countries with the
same type of liquidity protection and that, if these are correctly priced (i.e.,
with no information problems), then these may even serve to reduce moral
hazard.
To sum up this ﬁrst part of the paper, DV provide an application of BS
to the sovereign debt market and show that within that context the IMF
may have an interesting role to play. Although some aspects of the model
appear to sit uneasily with the sovereign nature of these markets, the re-
sult is intuitive and would probably carry over to other models of strate-
gic default.
Let me now turn briefly to the second part of the paper. Curiously the
theoretical model behind the second part of the paper does not appear to
be fully consistent with that in the ﬁrst part of the paper. In the ﬁrst part of
the paper, a crisis occurs when, with a speciﬁc probability, there is a bad out-
come and debt cannot be renegotiated. In the second part of the paper, a cri-
sis occurs when the demand for insurance just meets the supply. The source
of this uncertainty is then different; it is related to how much the insurance
is available.
Entering into this second framework, table 5.2 regresses the size of rescue
packages on a set of variables. It is not clear how the variables are speciﬁed
(everything in US$?), and the only variable that is signiﬁcant is bond stocks
outstanding at the time of the crisis. However, bonds outstanding might
have as much to do with supply as it has to do with demand (if debt ﬁnance
has been used to build up reserves, or if multilaterals care more about big
countries due to contagion eﬀects, etc.). It might be better to have the de-
pendent variable specified as a percentage of something (gross domes-
tic product [GDP]?) and the other variables expressed either as share vari-
ables (e.g., bonds, total liabilities, etc.) or perhaps even as growth variables.
Table 5.3 has the same dependent variable, and the only variable that is
signiﬁcant is the GDP at the time of the crisis. Because I would suggest scal-
ing the rescue variable by GDP, this might make this variable insignifi-
cant anyway!
However, if it remained signiﬁcant, this might be interpreted as a kind of
too-big-to-fail result. As the text considers issues related to the supply of
government guarantees, perhaps some indicators of such things should be
included, for example (a) type of deposit insurance in place, (b) the extent
144 Michael P. Dooley and Sujata Vermaof public banks, (c) historical experience in allowing banks or other com-
panies to fail, (d) bankruptcy procedures, and so on.
The results of tables 5.4 and 5.5 appear more interesting. The forecast
error of the amount of insurance is proxied by the sum of the supply and de-
mand error from the previous regressions. This raises issues about whether
coefﬁcients may be biased and also about units. It would be better to have
this error expressed as a percentage and not in US$.
To conclude, this is an interesting paper. It is really a story of two quite
diﬀerent and not necessarily consistent parts. I suspect that the authors
could extend both, thus making a fascinating research program.
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Discussion Summary
Robert P. Flood inquired why governments end up in this insurance busi-
ness. Shouldn’t the IMF prevent them from providing insurance? He also
noted that Michael Dooley’s crisis theory is unique—diﬀerent from the
ﬁrst- and second-generation crisis models, because in those there is no
transfer.
Morris Goldstein noted that the IMF is able to aﬀect negotiations be-
tween creditors and debtors: an example of that is the “lending into arrears”
policy. He also remarked that the former Compensatory Financing Facility
(CFF) lending window in the IMF discredits the notion that the IMF can-
not diﬀerentiate between liquidity (bad luck) and strategic default.
John McHale asked why, in this theory, real output costs are inevitable,
and what the channels are through which this loss comes about.
Martin Feldstein asked whether there were any examples of commercial
banks’ using denial of trade credits as a punishment tool.
Andrew Berg noted that an important class of creditors is the Paris club
and that the IMF does monitor Paris club discussions between debtors and
creditors.
Edwin M. Truman suggested that Peru in the 1980s is the closest case to
strategic default. He also noted that there were gainers from the precrisis
Rescue Packages and Output Losses Following Crises 145period—for example, through overvalued exchange rate—and these
should be accounted for in this output loss accounting.
Vincent Reinhart suggested that if the story is accurate then maybe the
IMF should have no access to capital.
Barry Eichengreen inquired whether the theory is consistent with previ-
ous statements by Dooley that the IMF should not condition its lending on
observable characteristics.
Peter Kenen suggested that “strategic default” is a loaded term and may
be used here inaccurately. He also noted that the devaluation and the rapid
loss of reserves might be channels for output loss in developing countries.
Martin Eichenbaum then noted that the size of the domestic insurance
pool and the deﬁnition of strategic default are tied together, and it is unclear
how to diﬀerentiate between them. In response, Feldstein noted that in the
Asian crisis, a lot of the international debt was private, and therefore, at
least theoretically, it could be a crisis of insolvency—even though the Asian
governments ended up taking over these bad debts.
Michael P. Dooley responded that, in practice, governments cannot roll
over debts using their future tax receipts as collateral, because the high in-
terest rates they are facing at the time of the crisis will make the present
value of those future taxes very small.
In response to Flood’s question, Dooley noted that, historically, govern-
ments did go into insurance when there were some big institutional changes
with unanticipated consequences. Liberalization, for example, meant that
looting was possible, as long as there was no eﬀective supervision. In Ko-
rea, the government did not understand how much it needed to regulate, for
instance. He also stated that although the IMF can aﬀect the balance of
power in negotiations, it can only do good if it has superior information on
the nature of crisis. What, uncomfortably, comes out of this theory, Dooley
further suggested, is that the IMF should not get involved at all if it cannot
monitor domestic ﬁnancial markets. He added that governments of devel-
oping countries could not credibly commit to not bailing out once a crisis
hits.
He concluded that the investors cheat the government, which gets money
from the IMF to pay those investors. The workers, in turn, pay for these
loans. Thus, during crises, there is a real transfer from workers (taxpayers)
to investors and ﬁnancial institutions.
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6.1 Introduction
Whether as a cause or an eﬀect, a systemic banking and corporate crisis
is often part of a currency crisis.1 Resolving a banking and corporate crisis
involves many policy choices ranging from the macroeconomic (including
monetary and ﬁscal policy) to the microeconomic (including capital ade-
quacy rules and corporate governance requirements), with reforms varying
in depth. These choices involve trade-oﬀs, including the amount of govern-
ment resources needed to resolve the crisis, the speed of recovery, and the
recovery’s sustainability. Despite considerable analysis, these trade-oﬀs are
not well known—an oversight that occasionally leads to conﬂicting policy
advice and larger-than-necessary economic costs. Even less is known about
the political economy factors that make governments choose certain poli-
cies.
This paper reviews knowledge about the trade-oﬀs involved in policies re-
lated to systemic ﬁnancial and corporate restructuring. It ﬁnds that a con-
sistent framework for bank and corporate restructuring is the key factor for
success—and one that is often missing. Consistency is needed in many ar-
eas and involves, among other elements, ensuring that there are suﬃcient
6
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1. In this chapter systemic is used to refer to a crisis that is large relative to a national econ-
omy, not necessarily one that is large relative to the global economy or that has other global
spillovers.resources for absorbing losses and that private agents face appropriate
sticks and carrots for restructuring. Moreover, sustainable restructuring re-
quires deep structural reforms, which often require addressing political
economy factors up front.
The paper complements the literature review with some new empirical
analysis using data for 687 corporations from eight crisis countries. It in-
vestigates the quantitative importance of some speciﬁc government poli-
cies: liquidity support to ﬁnancial institutions, the guaranteeing of the lia-
bilities of the ﬁnancial system during the early phase of the crisis, and the
establishment of a public asset management company during the restruc-
turing phase. It ﬁnds that a package of these measures can facilitate quicker
recovery by the corporate sector from a crisis and assist in the sustainabil-
ity of the recovery. The particular policies come with large ﬁscal costs, how-
ever, leading to trade-oﬀs in terms of an equitable distribution of the bene-
ﬁts and cost of the government intervention and, possibly, in terms of the
ultimate growth impact.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 presents an overview of the
general characteristics of banking system and corporate-sector crises. Sec-
tion 6.3 reviews the literature on banking and corporate-sector crises. Sec-
tion 6.4 provides empirical evidence on the eﬀects of crisis resolution
policies using firm-level data from a set of crisis countries. Section 6.5
concludes.
6.2 Characteristics of Banking and Corporate Crises
A systemic banking and corporate crisis is a situation in which an econ-
omy faces large-scale ﬁnancial and corporate distress within a short pe-
riod.2 Recent examples include the crisis in Nordic countries in the early
1990s, in Mexico in 1994–95, in East Asian countries after 1997, and in
transition economies in the 1990s (although for transition economies, ﬁ-
nancial distress and structural problems had been longer-term phenom-
ena). Banking and corporate crises appear to have become more common
since the early 1980s: Caprio and Klingebiel (2002) identify ninety-three
countries that experienced a systemic ﬁnancial crisis during the 1980s or
1990s (ﬁgure 6.1). It also appears that crises became deeper in the 1990s rel-
ative to earlier periods (Bordo et al. 2001).
In a systemic crisis, partly as a result of a general economic slowdown and
large shocks to foreign exchange and interest rates, corporate and ﬁnancial
sectors experience a large number of defaults and diﬃculties in repaying
contracts on time. As a result, nonperforming loans increase sharply. This
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2. We do not try to identify the exact causes of systemic distress or determine whether cur-
rency crises are caused by systemic ﬁnancial distress in banks and corporations or vice versa.

































































































































































































































































































.situation is often accompanied by depressed asset prices (such as equity and
real estate prices) on the heels of run-ups before the crisis, sharp increases
in real interest rates, and a slowdown or reversal in capital ﬂows (table 6.1).
In countries with longer-term ﬁnancial distress and other large-scale struc-
tural problems—such as several transition economies—a systemic crisis
may not be accompanied by such changes in asset prices and capital ﬂows,
partly because run-ups in prices and capital ﬂows may not have occurred.
Developments in crisis countries highlight the complicated coordination
problems that arise between corporations, between the corporate and ﬁ-
nancial sectors, between the government and the rest of the economy, and
with respect to domestic and foreign investors. In a systemic crisis, the fate
of an individual corporation and the best course of action for its owners and
managers will depend on the actions of many other corporations and ﬁ-
nancial institutions as well as on the general economic outlook. The ﬁnan-
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Table 6.1 Patterns of Systemic Banking Crises
Peak in Decline
Real Change in Real  in Real
Fiscal Peak GDP Exchange Interest Asset
Crisis Cost NPL Growth Rate Rates Prices
Year (% of GDP) (% of Loans) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Finland 1992 11.0 13 –4.6 –5.5 14.3 –34.6
Indonesia 1998 50.0 65–75 –15.4 –57.5 3.3 –78.5
Korea 1998 37.0 30–40 –10.6 –28.8 21.6 –45.9
Malaysia 1998 16.4 25–35 –12.7 –13.9 5.3 –79.9
Mexico 1995 19.3 30 –6.2 –39.8 24.7 –53.3
The Philippines 1998 0.5 20 –0.8 –13.0 6.3 –67.2
Sweden 1992 4.0 18 –3.3 +1.0 79.2 –6.8
Thailand 1998 32.8 33 –5.4 –13.7 17.2 –77.4
Sources: “Crisis year” (the peak crisis year) is from Caprio and Klingebiel (2002). The “ﬁscal cost (% of
GDP)” variable is from Honohan and Klingebiel (2002). The “peak NPL (nonperforming loans; % of to-
tal loans)” variable is from Caprio and Klingebiel (2002) in the case of Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines,
and Thailand; from Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996) in the case of Finland and Sweden; and from
Krueger and Tornell (1999) in the case of Mexico. Gross domestic product (GDP) data are from the In-
ternational Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics(IFS). The exchange rate, interest rate, and
inﬂation data are from IFS. We use the Datastream global market indexes for Finland, Mexico, and Swe-
den, and the IFS global market indexes for the other countries.
Notes: The “real GDP growth” variable equals the percentage change in real fourth-quarter GDP in the
crisis year compared to real fourth-quarter GDP one year before the crisis year. Consumer Price Index
(CPI) inﬂation is used to get the real growth in GDP, and the growth in GDP is in terms of local currency.
The inﬂation rate equals the percentage change in the CPI during the crisis year. The “change in exchange
rate” equals the percentage change of the exchange rate versus the U.S. dollar during the ﬁrst quarter of
the crisis year. An increase in the exchange rate indicates an appreciation. The “peak in real interest rates”
equals the peak in the real money market rate during crisis year. For the Philippines, the real discount rate
is reported instead of the money market rate, due to data unavailability. The “decline in real asset prices”
variable is the largest drop on a monthly basis in the stock market index during the crisis year compared
to the level of the stock market index in January of the year before the crisis year. The return is in local
currency and corrected for inﬂation.cial and corporate sectors, always closely intertwined, both need restruc-
turing in a systemic crisis, and the actions taken aﬀect their liquidity and
solvency. The government must set the rules of the game and be a prominent
actor in restructuring. Moreover, investors, domestic and foreign, will await
the actions of owners, the government, labor, and others—often implying a
shortage of foreign and domestic capital when it is most needed.
A crisis and its coordination problems are typically aggravated by insti-
tutional weaknesses, many of which likely caused the crisis in the ﬁrst place.
Bankruptcy and restructuring frameworks are often deﬁcient. Disclosure
and accounting rules may be weak for ﬁnancial institutions and corpora-
tions. Equity and creditor rights may be poorly deﬁned, and the judiciary is
often ineﬃcient. There is usually also a shortage of qualiﬁed managers in
the corporate and ﬁnancial sectors, as well as a lack of qualiﬁed domestic
restructuring and insolvency specialists, partly because there may be no his-
tory of corporate and ﬁnancial-sector restructuring. The government itself
may face credibility problems because it may have been partly to blame for
the crisis, and in general it faces many time consistency problems—such as
how to avoid large bailouts while also restarting the economy.
These complicated coordination problems suggest that systemic crises
are diﬃcult to resolve. Many observers have tried to develop best practices
for resolving such crises. We next review that literature.
6.3 Literature on Banking and Corporate Crises
Governments have used many approaches to try to resolve systemic bank
and corporate distress. Resolving systemic ﬁnancial distress is not easy, and
opinions diﬀer widely on what constitutes best practice. Many diﬀerent and
seemingly contradictory policy recommendations have been made to limit
the ﬁscal costs of crises and speed recovery. Empirical research supporting
particular views remains limited, and most research is limited to individual
cases.
Sheng (1996) made the ﬁrst attempt to distill lessons from several bank-
ing crises. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) expanded on those lessons using
additional crises. The main lesson from both eﬀorts is that managing a ﬁ-
nancial crisis is much diﬀerent in industrial countries from in emerging
markets because emerging markets have weaker institutions, crises are of-
ten larger, and other initial circumstances diﬀer. As a result, best practices
from industrial countries do not easily transfer to developing countries. An-
other key lesson is that there are many trade-oﬀs between various policies.
In reviewing the literature on ﬁnancial restructuring, especially in emerg-
ing markets, it is useful to diﬀerentiate between three phases of systemic re-
structuring. During the ﬁrst phase, which can be called the containment
phase, the ﬁnancial crisis is still unfolding. During this phase governments
tend to implement policies aimed at restoring public conﬁdence to mini-
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positors and other investors in the ﬁnancial system. The second phase in-
volves the actual ﬁnancial, and to a lesser extent operational, restructuring
of ﬁnancial institutions and corporations. The third phase involves struc-
tural reforms, including changes in laws and regulations, privatization of
any nationalized ﬁnancial institutions and corporations, and so on. Here we
discuss the containment phase, the restructuring of ﬁnancial institutions,
and the restructuring of corporations.
6.3.1 Containment Phase
Policy-makers often fail to respond eﬀectively to evidence of an impend-
ing banking crisis, hoping that banks and corporations will grow out of
their problems.3However, intervening early with a comprehensive and cred-
ible plan can avoid a systemic crisis, minimize adverse eﬀects, and limit
overall losses (Sheng 1996). Early intervention appears to be especially im-
portant in stopping the ﬂow of ﬁnancing to loss-making ﬁnancial institu-
tions and corporations and in limiting moral hazard in ﬁnancial institutions
and corporations gambling for survival.
Experience also suggests that intervention and closing of weak ﬁnancial
institutions need to be properly managed. Uncertainty among depositors
needs to be limited; otherwise, the government may have to try to resolve a
loss of conﬁdence with an unlimited guarantee on the liabilities of banks
and other ﬁnancial institutions. However, in practice, ad hoc closures are
more the norm and often add to uncertainty, triggering a systemic crisis.
For example, in late 1997 the closing of sixteen banks in Indonesia triggered
a depositor run because depositors were aware that some politically con-
nected banks known to be insolvent were kept open (Lindgren et al. 2000).
Similarly, the suspension of ﬁnance companies in Thailand increased un-
certainty among depositors as well as borrowers.
Reviewing several cases, Baer and Klingebiel (1995) suggest that, to avoid
uncertainty among depositors and limit their incentives to run, policy mak-
ers need to deal simultaneously with all insolvent and marginally solvent in-
stitutions. Intermittent regulatory intervention makes depositors more ner-
vous and undermines regulatory credibility, especially if regulators had
previously argued that the institutions involved were solvent.4 Moreover, in
emerging markets regulations are often weak, supervision is limited, and
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3. There are many political economy reasons that policy makers may not wish to act—
thereby giving rise to a crisis—but we do not discuss them here (see Haggard 2001).
4. Baer and Klingebiel also point out that a comprehensive approach places less demand on
supervisory resources. Under a piecemeal approach, insolvent and marginally solvent institu-
tions would continue to exist while other insolvent institutions were being closed or restruc-
tured. Marginally solvent institutions would be subject to moral hazard and fraud while being
unable and unwilling to raise additional capital. Especially in an environment with weak su-
pervision, comprehensive approaches are thus more necessary.data on ﬁnancial solvency are poor, so intervention tools need to be fairly
simple.
For example, a rehabilitation program for undercapitalized ﬁnancial in-
stitutions—which involves institutions’ indicating how they plan to meet
capital adequacy requirements in the future—requires careful government
oversight and good ﬁnancial statements. However, such features are often
missing in developing countries. Instead of relying on rehabilitation that re-
quires good oversight and data, regulators could apply a 100 percent (mar-
ginal) reserve requirement on deposit inﬂows and other new liabilities, lim-
iting weak banks’ ability to reallocate resources in a detrimental way.
There are two schools of thought on whether to use liquidity support and
unlimited guarantees during the containment phase.5 Some argue that cri-
sis conditions make it almost impossible to distinguish between solvent and
insolvent institutions, leaving the authorities with little choice but to extend
liquidity support. Moreover, it is argued that an unlimited guarantee pre-
serves the payments system and helps stabilize institutions’ ﬁnancial claims
while restructuring is being organized and carried out (Lindgren et al.
2000).
Others argue that open-ended liquidity support provides more time for
insolvent institutions to gamble (unsuccessfully) on resurrection, facilitates
continued ﬁnancing of loss-making borrowers, and allows owners and
managers to engage in looting. Supporters of this view also argue that a
government guarantee on ﬁnancial institutions’ liabilities reduces large
creditors’ incentives to monitor ﬁnancial institutions, allowing bank man-
agers and shareholders to continue gambling on their insolvent banks and
increasing ﬁscal costs. They further point out that extensive guarantees
limit government maneuverability in allocating losses, often with the end
result that the government incurs most of the cost of the systemic crisis
(Sheng 1996).
In practice, there is a trade-oﬀ between restoring conﬁdence and con-
taining ﬁscal costs. Evidence on these trade-oﬀs comes from Honohan and
Klingebiel (2002), who show that much of the variation in the ﬁscal cost of
forty crises in industrial and developing economies in 1980–97 can be ex-
plained by government approaches to resolving liquidity crises. The au-
thors ﬁnd that governments that provided open-ended liquidity support
and blanket deposit guarantees incurred much higher costs in resolving ﬁ-
nancial crises. They also ﬁnd that these costs are higher in countries with
weak institutions.
Most important, Honohan and Klingebiel ﬁnd no obvious trade-oﬀ be-
tween ﬁscal costs and subsequent economic growth (or overall output
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5. A third school argues that the granting of government guarantees is the outcome of po-
litical economy circumstances and so is often a foregone conclusion. See Dooley and Verma
(chap. 5 in this volume).losses). Countries that used policies such as liquidity support, blanket guar-
antees, and particularly costly forbearance did not recover faster. Rather,
liquidity support appears to make recovery from a crisis longer and output
losses larger—a ﬁnding conﬁrmed by Bordo et al. (2001). Thus it appears
that the two most important policies during the containment phase are to
limit liquidity support and not to extend guarantees. Where institutions are
weak, governments may need to use simple methods in dealing with weak
banks and a loss of conﬁdence to avoid higher ﬁscal contingencies and
costs.
6.3.2 Restructuring Financial Institutions
Once ﬁnancial markets have been stabilized, the second phase involves
restructuring weak ﬁnancial institutions and corporations. Restructuring is
complex because policy-makers need to take into account many issues. Fi-
nancial restructuring will depend on the speed at which macroeconomic
stability can be achieved because that determines the viability of corpora-
tions, banks, and other ﬁnancial institutions, and more generally the re-
duction in overall uncertainty. However, macroeconomic stability often re-
quires progress on ﬁnancial and corporate restructuring, so it cannot be
viewed independently of the restructuring process (see Burnside, Eichen-
baum, and Rebelo, chap. 7 in this volume; Park and Lee, chap. 9 in this vol-
ume).
Restructuring refers to several related processes: recognizing and allo-
cating ﬁnancial losses, restructuring the ﬁnancial claims of ﬁnancial insti-
tutions and corporations, and operational restructuring of ﬁnancial insti-
tutions and corporations. Recognition involves the allocation of losses and
associated redistribution of wealth and control. Losses—that is, diﬀerences
between the market value of assets and the nominal value of liabilities held
by ﬁnancial institutions and corporations—can be allocated to sharehold-
ers (through dilution), to depositors and creditors (by reducing the present
value of their claims), to employees (through reduced wages) and suppliers,
and to the government or the public (through higher taxes, lower spending,
or inﬂation). Here we discuss the restructuring of ﬁnancial institutions; the
next section discusses the restructuring of corporations.
To minimize moral hazard and strengthen ﬁnancial discipline, govern-
ments can allocate losses not only to shareholders but also to creditors and
large depositors who should have been monitoring the banks. Often, how-
ever, governments assume all losses through their guarantees. There are ex-
ceptions to the model of governments’ guaranteeing all liabilities in an
eﬀort to restore conﬁdence. Baer and Klingebiel (1995) show that in some
crises—notably in the United States (1933), Japan (1946), Argentina (1980–
82), and Estonia (1992)—governments have imposed losses on depositors
with little or no adverse macroeconomic consequences or ﬂight to currency.
In these cases, economic recovery was rapid, and ﬁnancial intermediation,
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creditors or depositors will not necessarily lead to runs on banks or end in
contraction of aggregate money, credit, and output. In a related vein,
Caprio and Klingebiel’s (1996) review of country cases indicates that ﬁnan-
cial discipline is further strengthened when bank management—often part
of the problem—is changed and banks are operationally restructured.
Besides loss allocation, ﬁnancial and corporate restructuring crucially
depends on the incentives under which banks and corporations operate.
Successful corporate debt workouts require proper incentives for banks and
borrowers to come to the negotiating table (Dado and Klingebiel 2002).
The incentive framework for banks includes accounting, classiﬁcation, and
provisioning rules: that is, ﬁnancial institutions need to be asked to realisti-
cally mark their assets to market. The framework also includes laws and
prudential regulations. Regulators should ensure that undercapitalized ﬁ-
nancial institutions are properly disciplined and closed. The insolvency sys-
tem should enable ﬁnancial institutions to enforce their claims on corpora-
tions, allow for speedy ﬁnancial restructuring of viable corporations, and
provide for the eﬃcient liquidation of enterprises that cannot be rehabili-
tated. Proper incentives also mean limited ownership links between banks
and corporations (because otherwise the same party could end up being
both debtor and creditor).
Adequately capitalized ﬁnancial institutions are a key component of a
proper incentive framework, because ﬁnancial institutions need to have
suﬃcient loss absorption capacity to engage in sustainable corporate re-
structuring. In a systemic crisis, capital will often have to come from the
government through recapitalization. However, general experience—sup-
ported by recent events in East Asia—suggests that recapitalization of ﬁ-
nancial institutions needs to be structured and managed to limit moral haz-
ard. In their analysis of forty bank crises, Honohan and Klingebiel (2002)
ﬁnd that repeated, incomplete recapitalizations tend to increase the ﬁscal
costs of resolving a crisis. One possible explanation is that marginally capi-
talized banks tend to engage in cosmetic corporate restructuring—such as
maturity extensions or interest rate reductions on loans to nonviable cor-
porations—rather than writing oﬀ debts.
Besides adequate capitalization, preferably by private shareholders,
banks’ incentives to undertake corporate restructuring can be strengthened
by linking government ﬁnancing to the restructuring. For example, a capi-
tal support scheme in which additional ﬁscal resources are linked to corpo-
rate restructuring through loss sharing arrangements can induce banks to
conduct deeper restructuring. Regardless, especially in weak institutional
settings, limits on the actions of marginally capitalized banks will typically
be necessary.
In principle, governments should only capitalize or strengthen the capi-
tal base of ﬁnancial institutions with charter and franchise value. However,
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to distinguish good banks from bad. Risk-sharing mechanisms with the
private sector, such as coﬁnancing arrangements with government equity
infusion (in the form of preferred shares) when the private sector provides
capital, can help identify better banks. This setup still requires decent insti-
tutions to avoid misuse. Especially in a weak institutional environment with
limited private capital, governments may want to rely more on hard budget
constraints on weak banks (such as a 100 percent marginal reserve require-
ment on new deposits) to prevent a large leakage of ﬁscal resources, in-
cluding those that occur through excessive guarantees on ﬁnancial institu-
tions’ liabilities. Additionally, good banks may need to be actively coerced
to receive support, because they may resist government interference. With-
out some support, however, good banks may not be able to provide ﬁnan-
cial intermediation to corporations, thus aggravating the crisis.
6.3.3 Restructuring Corporations
Providing the Right Incentives
The nature of a systemic crisis, as well as the already close links between
the solvency and performance of the corporate and ﬁnancial sectors in nor-
mal times, makes it clear that bank restructuring needs to be complemented
by corporate restructuring. To start corporate restructuring, corporations
should quickly be triaged into operationally viable and not ﬁnancially dis-
tressed corporations, operationally viable but ﬁnancially distressed corpo-
rations, and ﬁnancially and operationally unviable corporations. In a nor-
mal restructuring of an individual case of ﬁnancial distress, private agents
will make these decisions and start the operational and ﬁnancial restruc-
turing.6However, in a systemic crisis case-by-case restructuring will be diﬃ-
cult because the incentives under which agents operate are likely not to be
conducive, private capital is typically limited, and coordination problems
are large.7
Nevertheless, the starting point is providing proper incentives for private
agents to allow and encourage market-based, sustainable corporate re-
structuring. Given that the crisis was likely to have been partly induced by
weaknesses in the environment in which the corporate sector operated, the
ﬁrst step for government will have to be creating an enabling environment.
Depending on country circumstances, this can imply undertaking corpo-
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6. Financial restructuring for corporations can take many forms: reschedulings (extensions
of maturities), lower interest rates, debt-for-equity swaps, debt forgiveness, indexing interest
payments to earnings, and so on. Operational restructuring, an ongoing process, includes im-
provements in eﬃciency and management, reductions in staﬀ and wages, asset sales (such as a
reduction in subsidiaries), enhanced marketing eﬀorts, and the like, with the expectation of in-
creased proﬁtability and cash ﬂow.
7. For other papers on systemic corporate restructuring, including speciﬁc case studies, see
Claessens, Djankov, and Mody (2001).rate governance reforms, improving bankruptcy and other restructuring
frameworks, making the judicial system more eﬃcient, liberalizing entry by
foreign investors, changing the competitive framework for the real sector,
or introducing other supportive structural measures. In general, the politi-
cal economy of reform suggests that a crisis can often be a time to get diﬃ-
cult structural reforms accepted or at least initiated (Haggard 2001).
Most crisis countries do reform the incentives for restructuring (see
Claessens, Djankov, and Klingebiel 2001; Dado and Klingebiel 2002; Stone
2000a,b; and World Bank 2000 for diﬀerent groups of crisis countries), al-
though the strengths and depth of the reforms diﬀer. For example, Indone-
sia adopted a new bankruptcy system to replace its pre–World War II
Dutch code in August 1998, twelve months after its crisis started. Similarly,
Thailand’s senate approved the Act for the Establishment of and Procedure
for Bankruptcy Court, intended to increase the eﬃciency of judicial proce-
dures in bankruptcy cases, in February 1999, nineteen months after its cri-
sis began. Despite the act’s adoption, however, bankruptcies in Thailand re-
mained few in number and fraught with diﬃculties (Foley 2000).
Beyond ﬁxing the environment, it can be necessary to provide extra in-
centives for private agents to engage in (quick) corporate restructuring.
These incentives can involve tax, accounting, and other measures. Banks,
for example, may be given more tax relief for provisioning or restructuring
loans. Corporations may be given more favorable accounting relief for rec-
ognizing foreign exchange losses. In the wake of its crisis, the Republic of
Korea adopted more favorable tax rules for corporate restructuring, al-
though they ended up being misused through cosmetic rather than real re-
structuring. Some countries have oﬀered guarantees on exchange rate be-
havior, such as Indonesia’s INDRA scheme and Mexico’s FICORCA
scheme (see Stone 2000a). The eﬃciency of such measures should be evalu-
ated from various perspectives, taking into account their beneﬁts for re-
structuring and public ﬁnance as well as their possible redistributive eﬀects.
However, although such measures may speed recovery, they often do not
contribute to fundamental reforms. In any case, the general opinion is that
such measures should be temporary (that is, equipped with sunset clauses).
Improving the Framework for Restructuring
Even when adequate for normal times, a revamped bankruptcy and re-
structuring framework might not be suﬃcient during a systemic crisis,
given the coordination problems and weaknesses in other aspects of the in-
stitutional framework. Thus, governments have created special frameworks
for corporate restructuring, such as the “London rules,”8 ﬁrst used in Mex-
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8. The London rules are principles for corporate reorganization ﬁrst proposed in the United
Kingdom in the early 1990s. Because the rules were not designed for systemic corporate dis-
tress, countries have tightened them in various ways.ico and then in several East Asian countries (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
Thailand). The London rules involve an out-of-court accord, under regular
contract or commercial law, that all or most creditor institutions are co-
erced to sign. With such an accord, agreements reached among most cred-
itors can often be enforced on other creditors without formal judicial pro-
cedures.
Arbitration with specific deadlines—and penalties for failing to meet
the deadlines—can also be part of the accord, avoiding a formal judicial
process to resolve disputes.9 The degree of such enhancements to the Lon-
don rules has varied among countries. In East Asia the frameworks in Ko-
rea, Malaysia, and Thailand were the most conducive to out-of-court re-
structuring, whereas the framework in Indonesia was the least conducive
(Claessens, Djankov, and Klingebiel 2001). These diﬀerences appear partly
to explain the variations in the speed of restructuring in these four coun-
tries.
The most far-reaching proposal for enhancing the restructuring frame-
work is “super-bankruptcy” (or “super Chapter 11”), a temporary tool that
allows corporate management to stay in place and forces debt-to-equity
conversions (Stiglitz 2001). This tool can preserve ﬁrms’ value as going con-
cerns by preventing too many liquidations and keeping in place existing
managers, who arguably most often know best how to run the ﬁrms. An im-
portant issue is when to call for a super Chapter 11—that is, when is a cri-
sis systemic, and who has the authority to call for such a suspension of pay-
ments? Political economy factors should be taken into account, because
some debtors could gain disproportionately from a suspension of pay-
ments. To date no country has taken this approach.10
Even with a better enabling environment, agents will likely be unable to
triage corporations quickly and proceed with restructuring. The resulting
debt overhang or deadlock in claims can be especially risky when institu-
tions are weak, and it can greatly increase the ﬁnal costs to the public sec-
tor of resolving the crisis. Weak banks may continue to lend to corporations
that are “too big to fail,” partly as a way of gambling for resurrection, and
so delay sustainable corporate restructuring. Owners of defunct enterprises
may strip assets, leaving only shells of liabilities for creditors. Even ﬁnan-
cially viable corporations may stop paying promptly if faced with an insol-
vent banking system.
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9. Out-of-court negotiations and bankruptcy or other legal resolution techniques are not the
only ways of dealing with ﬁnancial distress. Economists have been proposing alternative pro-
cedures for some time, centering on versions of an asset sale or cash auction. Cash auctions are
easy to administer and do not rely on the judicial system (Hart et al. 1997). Although attrac-
tive from a theoretical perspective, these proposals have not had recent followers except Mex-
ico in 1998.
10. Although bankruptcy laws diﬀer considerably even among industrial countries, there
has been a general move from more creditor-friendly regimes that are liquidation-oriented to
more debtor-friendly regimes that are more restructuring-oriented (Westbrook 2001).In such cases it may be necessary in the short run to use hard budget con-
straints to limit the ﬂow of resources to weak corporations from weak ﬁ-
nancial institutions or other sources. To increase credit to corporations that
can actually repay and limit lending to weak corporations it may also be
necessary to have temporary across-the-board mechanisms for certain
types of borrowers (such as small and medium-sized enterprises) or certain
activities (such as trade ﬁnancing). The need for such blunter tools will in-
crease with a country’s institutional weakness. Indonesia’s market-based
approach to corporate restructuring, for example, seems to have had little
impact and probably only led to further asset stripping.
Choosing a Lead Agent
As a next step, it is often necessary for governments to more directly sup-
port corporate restructuring. As with support for the ﬁnancial system, it is
essential to restructure strong and viable corporations, not weak ones. All
too often, however, unviable corporations (such as those considered too big
too fail) receive support instead of deserving, operationally viable corpora-
tions. This was the case with Korea’s large chaebol and with Indonesia and
Thailand’s large family-controlled conglomerates. These ﬁrms ended up re-
ceiving disproportionately large ﬁnancing during the ﬁrst phase of the cri-
sis,  while smaller ﬁrms lacked even working capital (Domaç and Ferri
1999). Thus, it is crucial to choose a lead agent that ensures proper analysis
of corporations’ prospects as well as durable operational and ﬁnancial re-
structurings.
The main choice for the lead agent in restructuring is between the gov-
ernment and the private sector. Many approaches are possible. A central-
ized asset management corporation will put the government in charge. Re-
capitalization of private banks will put the banks in charge. Under other
models, investors and corporations can become the lead agent, with the
government sharing the risks. Banks can work out nonperforming loans,
for example, but with some stop-loss arrangements with the government.
Alternatively, nonperforming loans can be transferred to a number of cor-
porate restructuring vehicles that, although state-owned, can be privately
run by asset managers with incentive stakes.
Most important is that the lead agent have the necessary capacity to ab-
sorb losses as well as the institutional capacity, incentives, and external en-
forcement mechanisms to eﬀect restructuring. Undercapitalized banks, for
example, will not be very eﬀective restructuring agents; and without a work-
ing bankruptcy regime, private agents will not be able to force recalcitrant
debtors to the negotiating table—as in Indonesia and in Thailand, where
the restructuring of Thai Petrochemical Industry took three years.
Countries often choose a mix of these approaches when dealing with a
systemic crisis. In 1995 Mexico tried both an asset management corpora-
tion and a more decentralized approach. The four East Asian crisis coun-
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agement corporations, all used out-of-court systems for corporate restruc-
turing, and most used, after some initial period, ﬁscal stimulus and mone-
tary policy to foster economic growth. In addition, all enhanced, to varying
degrees, their basic frameworks for private-sector operations, including
bankruptcy and corporate governance frameworks, liberalization of for-
eign entry in the ﬁnancial and corporate sectors, and so on. However, suc-
cess has varied with the intensity of these measures (Claessens, Djankov,
and Klingebiel 2001).
Empirical evidence on these mechanisms is limited but tends to favor the
decentralized model. A study of seven centralized approaches using asset
management companies found that most of the corporations did not
achieve their stated objectives with corporate restructuring (Klingebiel
2001). The study distinguishes corporate restructuring asset management
companies from bank rehabilitation asset management companies. Two of
the three corporate restructuring companies did not achieve their narrow
goal of expediting restructuring. Only Sweden’s asset management com-
pany successfully managed its portfolio, acting in some instances as the lead
agent in restructuring.
Rapid asset disposition vehicles fared somewhat better, with two of
four—in Spain and the United States—achieving their objectives. These
successes suggest that asset management corporations can be eﬀective, but
only for narrowly deﬁned purposes of resolving insolvent and unviable ﬁ-
nancial institutions and selling their assets. However, even achieving these
objectives requires many ingredients: a type of asset that is easily liqueﬁed
(such as real estate), mostly professional management, political independ-
ence, a skilled human resource base, appropriate funding, adequate bank-
ruptcy and foreclosure laws, good information and management systems,
and transparent operations and processes.
The ﬁndings by Klingebiel (2001) on asset management companies are
corroborated by a review of three East Asian countries (Dado 2000). The
centralized asset management companies in Indonesia and Korea did not
appear likely to achieve their narrow goal of expediting bank or corporate
restructuring, whereas Malaysia’s was relatively successful, aided by that
country’s strong bankruptcy system. Success has also varied when a mix of
approaches is tried. In Mexico neither the asset management company nor
the enhanced restructuring framework was eﬀective, possibly because fun-
damental reforms were lacking (Mexico’s bankruptcy regime, for example,
was not revamped until four years after its crisis). Export-led growth ap-
pears to have led Mexico’s recovery after 1995 (although growth did not re-
solve banking problems; see Krueger and Tornell 1999).
Dado and Klingebiel (2002) analyze decentralized restructuring in seven
countries: Argentina, Chile, Hungary, Japan, Norway, Poland, and Thai-
land. They ﬁnd that the success of this approach depended on the quality of
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initial conditions, including the capital positions of banks and ownership
links. In Norway the government built on favorable initial conditions to at-
tain a solid overall framework for the decentralized approach. The biggest
improvements to the overall framework was made in Chile, with favorable
results. Poland and Hungary ranked behind Chile, although Poland im-
proved its framework much faster than did Hungary. Thailand made little
progress on strengthening its framework. In Japan, despite many reforms to
the overall framework, eﬀorts remained blocked by large ownership links.
Argentina relied solely on public debt relief programs and did not change
its overall framework for restructuring.
Changing Ownership Structures
Just as a crisis can oﬀer a window for structural reform, it can provide an
opportunity to reform a country’s ownership structures. As a direct party
to the restructuring process, the state often becomes the owner of defunct
ﬁnancial institutions and corporations. This development severely compli-
cates the resolution of the crisis, because the government may not have the
right incentives or capacity to eﬀect the needed operational and ﬁnancial
restructuring. At the same time, large ownership by the state of the ﬁnan-
cial and corporate sectors provides an opportunity to change ownership
structures as part of restructuring. This move can have several beneﬁts.
First, the changes can correct ownership structures that contributed to
the crisis and so help prevent future crises. To the extent, for example, that
ownership concentrated in the hands of a few families contributed to the
crisis—as was argued by some for East Asia—the government can try to
widen ownership structures.
Second, the government can try to obtain political support for restruc-
turing by reallocating ownership.11One option is to reprivatize ﬁnancial in-
stitutions or corporations in a way that redistributes ownership among the
general public or employees of the restructured institution. Another option
is to use some of the state ownership to endow unfunded pension obliga-
tions from a pay-as-you-go system. In this way, the government can create
ownership structures that, over time, will reinforce its reforms.
Third, changing ownership structures can introduce third parties who
have better incentives and skills in restructuring individual corporations
and determining ﬁnancial relief. One option is to transfer nonperforming
loans to a fund jointly owned by private and public shareholders, but with
the private stake having lower seniority. Private shareholders in the fund
would then have the right incentives when deciding on the ﬁnancial viabil-
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11. Regardless of the changes in ownership and the relationships between debtors and cred-
itors, the government may want to create a special social safety net for laid-oﬀ workers to help
sustain political support for restructuring over time. See Levinsohn, Berry, and Friedman
(chap. 12 in this volume) for the case of Indonesia.ity of a corporation, but without having full formal ownership of the as-
sets. Public resources would be provided only when all parties—creditor
banks, other creditors, new private investors, the government, and the
private shareholders in the fund—had reached agreement with the cor-
poration.
Pursuing Supportive Macroeconomic Policies
Another common theme in the literature is that corporate restructuring
should occur in the context of supportive macroeconomic policies. The
right macroeconomic policies (ﬁscal and monetary) can speed the recovery
of overall activity and corporate output. The appropriate ﬁscal stance has
been extensively reviewed, especially in the context of the East Asian crisis.
A review by the International Monetary Fund suggests that East Asian
countries’ ﬁscal stance was too tight initially (Lane et al. 1999). The appro-
priate monetary stance has been more controversial and is still being de-
bated (see Cho and West, chap. 1 in this volume; Drazen, chap. 2 in this vol-
ume), but mainly in terms of defending the exchange rate.
An important related aspect is the eﬀect on the corporate sector through
a possible credit crunch. Microeconomic-based empirical literature sug-
gests evidence of a credit crunch early in the East Asian crisis (Claessens,
Djankov, and Xu 2000; Colaco, Hallward-Driemeier, and Dwor-Frecaut
2000; Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier 2000). The crunch was likely the re-
sult of tighter capital adequacy requirements and the monetary policies be-
ing pursued. More generally, it has been found that although tighter capital
adequacy rules have minimal eﬀects on aggregate credit provision, borrow-
ers from weak banks are aﬀected by tighter regulation and supervision
(Bank for International Settlements 1999). Given the unbalanced ﬁnancial
systems in East Asia—where banks dominate and little alternative ﬁnanc-
ing was available, and many banks were fragile even before the crisis
(Claessens and Glaessner 1997)—it is likely that, at least initially, banking
weaknesses and tighter regulation and supervision led to a credit crunch for
East Asian corporations (Domaç and Ferri 1999). Following this initial
crunch, corporations may have ended up with a debt overhang, with a con-
sequent need for ﬁnancial restructuring.
6.4 Additional Empirical Evidence on the 
Eﬀects of Crisis Resolution Policies
In this section, we shed more light on the costs and beneﬁts of alternative
crisis resolution policies. Speciﬁcally, we empirically investigate how poli-
cies aﬀect the performance and ﬁnancial structures of individual corpora-
tions. We focus on the corporate sector for several reasons. First, the ﬁnal
purpose of resolution policies, even if directed toward the ﬁnancial sector
only, is a revitalization of the real sector and overall economic growth. Us-
162 Stijn Claessens, Daniela Klingebiel, and Luc Laevening corporate-sector indicators can thus provide a better measure of the
final outcome. Second, the eﬀects of policies can be more precisely mea-
sured by focusing on the corporate sector rather than the financial sec-
tor. The performance of banks, for example, will be highly aﬀected by
government ﬁnancial actions, such as recapitalization, and therefore may
not provide a good indication of the real outcomes achieved. Third, meas-
uring the impact of resolution policies on a micro rather than a macro level
(for example, by gross domestic product) allows us to better diﬀerentiate
across policies. We can control, for example, for country characteristics,
such as diﬀerent corporate-sector structures, when studying policies com-
monly adopted.
We collect company-speciﬁc data for a sample of crisis countries around
the period of crisis in each respective country. Our sample selection pro-
ceeded as follows. We collected company data from WorldScope for all
emerging markets and developed countries that were classiﬁed by Caprio
and Klingebiel (2002) as having had a systemic ﬁnancial crisis. We had to
exclude all crises prior to 1989 because WorldScope does not have suﬃcient
data before 1989. We also had to exclude countries for which the crisis pe-
riod is diﬃcult to time, either because of multiple crises (such as in Ar-
gentina) or because the crisis stretches over a long period of time without
clear peaks or ends (as in Japan). This left us with seventeen countries with
a systemic crisis. We had to further exclude some countries for which we did
not have a signiﬁcant number of corporations with available data. This set
of excluded countries includes nine transition countries (Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slove-
nia) and Venezuela. For Venezuela, for example, we only had nine corpora-
tions for the whole sample period.
Given the data availability, we are left with eight crisis countries, namely
Finland, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Swe-
den, and Thailand. For each country, we distinguish three periods. The cri-
sis year is the year of the peak of the crisis as identiﬁed by Caprio and
Klingebiel (2002). The precrisis year is deﬁned as the average of the three
years before the peak of the crisis and the postcrisis year as one year after
the peak of the crisis. Table 6.2 reports the sample of crisis countries and
their respective crisis years.
In total, we have company-speciﬁc data from WorldScope for 687 ﬁrms.
The data could suﬀer from a bias if many sampled ﬁrms entered bankruptcy
during the crisis years. For most countries, however, the set of ﬁrms is quite
similar between pre- and postcrisis periods. In fact, the data set includes
more ﬁrms during the crisis year than during the precrisis year.12 This sug-
gests that the data set does not suﬀer from a large survivorship or other re-
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12. We have data on 990 ﬁrms for the precrisis years, 1,183 ﬁrms for the crisis years, and 889
ﬁrms for the postcrisis years. In the regressions we use a balanced panel of 687 ﬁrms.porting bias. The notable exception is the Republic of Korea, for which the
number of ﬁrms reporting in the postcrisis period is signiﬁcantly less than
those in the precrisis and crisis periods. The main reason is that at the date
of data collection many Korean ﬁrms had not yet reported their ﬁnancial
statements for 1999.13
In estimating the impact of resolution policies on the performance of the
corporate sectors, we distinguish between the depth of the crisis, the recov-
ery after the crisis, and the sustainability of the recovery. As a measure for
the depth of the crisis, we use the diﬀerence in a corporation’s operating in-
come, deﬁned as earnings before interest and taxes with depreciation
added, as a ratio of sales, that is, the ratio of earnings before interest and
taxes with depreciation added (EBITDA) to sales, between the precrisis and
crisis periods. Similarly, our measure for the degree of recovery of corporate
performance is the diﬀerence in EBITDA-sales between the postcrisis and
crisis periods. Our measure for the sustainability of the recovery is the
diﬀerence in EBITDA-sales between the postcrisis and precrisis periods.
Table 6.3 reports summary statistics of the company-speciﬁc data for
EBITDA-sales, interest coverage, leverage, debt composition (share of
short-term) and share of payables (trade) relative to total assets—the main
variables used in the empirical analysis—across all countries. It is worth
noting that the interest coverage ﬁgure (measured as operating income to
interest payments) reﬂects both ﬁrm proﬁtability and debt structure. We
ﬁnd that, measured by EBITDA-sales, ﬁrms performed the worst during
the crisis year. Firms had a worse interest coverage during the crisis year
than before and were more leveraged at the peak of the crisis than before the
crisis. Firms generally reduced the share of short-term debt over the crisis
period, whereas the share of trade debt was mostly unaﬀected by the crisis.
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Table 6.2 Sample Crisis Countries and Crisis Years
Precrisis Peak of Crisis Postcrisis
Finland 1989 1992 1993
Indonesia 1995 1998 1999
South Korea 1995 1998 1999
Malaysia 1995 1998 1999
Mexico 1992 1995 1996
The Philippines 1995 1998 1999
Sweden 1989 1992 1993
Thailand 1995 1998 1999
Source: Caprio and Klingebiel (2002); authors’ deﬁnitions.
13. This reporting discrepancy may still result into a sample selection bias if, for example,
late reporting is more common among unproﬁtable ﬁrms than among proﬁtable ﬁrms. This




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.We also ﬁnd that, although both the performance and capital structure of
ﬁrms improved after the peak of the crisis, ﬁrms did not reach precrisis per-
formance levels and ﬁnancing structures within two years after the peak of
the crisis.
These general trends are also reﬂected in ﬁgures 6.2 and 6.3, which plot,
respectively, the EBITDA-sales and interest coverage ratios for the three pe-
riods. The earnings and interest coverage distributions shift to the left be-
tween the precrisis and the crisis periods and then recover somewhat, but
not to the distribution before the crisis. When performance and sustain-
ability are measured using other measures, similar results obtain. For ex-
ample, the median operating return on assets falls from 5.5 percent in the
precrisis period to 1.4 percent during the crisis period and then recovers to
2.8 percent in the postcrisis period. The median ratio of the market to book
value of equity moves from 1.8 before the crisis period to 0.7 during the cri-
sis period, to recover to only 1.03 in the postcrisis period.
Table 6.3 also reports the summary statistics for individual countries for
the same set of variables. The patterns for each country are generally the
same as for the overall medians. Some exceptions are Finland, Indonesia,
Mexico, and Sweden, where postcrisis corporate-sector performance is on
average better than precrisis performance. In these countries, some corpo-
rations may have beneﬁted from the depreciation of the exchange rate,
which would explain the better performance. This is not the case for the
other countries: in Thailand, for example, postcrisis performance is actu-
ally the worst of all three periods. Korea and Malaysia correspond to the
pattern for the whole sample, with the recovery performance above the cri-
sis level but below the precrisis level. In terms of interest coverage, the pic-
ture is more uniform across the countries: some deterioration during the
crisis, generally followed by an improvement. The exceptions are Malaysia
and Thailand, where the average interest coverage ratios decline through-
out.
Apart from industry and other corporation-speciﬁc factors, such as cor-
porations’ initial ﬁnancial structures, diﬀerences in the policies adopted
may explain some of the diﬀerences. Our literature review, and in particular
Honohan and Klingebiel (2002), motivates the speciﬁc policy measures we
investigate. Honohan and Klingebiel identiﬁed for a large sample of coun-
tries those policy measures that could be systematically linked to the ﬁscal
costs of resolving a systemic crisis. The three speciﬁc policy variables we use
from their analysis are (a) whether the central bank has provided liquidity
support to ﬁnancial institutions during the crisis; (b) whether the govern-
ment has guaranteed bank liabilities; and (c) whether the government has
established a publicly owned, centralized asset management company. As
noted in section 6.3, Honohan and Klingebiel show that these three mea-
sures particularly increased the overall ﬁscal costs of resolving a crisis, con-
trolling for a number of country-speciﬁc factors. Because we investigate
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Table 6.4 Resolution Policies across Sampled Countries
Yes No
Guarantee Finland, Indonesia, Korea,  The Philippines (1)
Malaysia, Mexico, Sweden, 
Thailand (7)
Liquidity support Finland, Indonesia, Korea,  Malaysia, the Philippines,
Mexico, Thailanda (5) Sweden (3)
Public AMC Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,  Finland, the Philippines, 
Mexico (4) Sweden, Thailand (4)
Source: Honohan and Klingebiel (2002).
aLiquidity support is provided to nonbank ﬁnancial institutions only, not to deposit and
money banks as well.
whether these policies resulted in improved performance and ﬁnancial sus-
tainability of the corporate sector, we can shed some light on whether a
trade-oﬀmight exist for certain policies between ﬁscal costs and corporate-
sector outcomes.
Table 6.4 presents the policy measures taken in the sampled countries.
There are many similarities in policies across countries. Almost all coun-
tries’ governments, for example, guaranteed the liabilities of the ﬁnancial
sector during the crisis, and only the Philippines did not. About half of the
countries had extensive liquidity support to the ﬁnancial sector, and, simi-
larly, about half did establish a public asset management corporation. The
Philippines is the only country that did not undertake any of the three res-
olution measures. The correlation between the implementation of these
policy measures is substantial,14 suggesting that they tend to be imple-
mented as a package.
Given the limited number of countries in our sample and the fact that the
policy measures are correlated, it is diﬃcult to assess the impact of the im-
plementation of each of the three policy variables in isolation, and regres-
sion results from using individual policy dummies could be unreliable. We
therefore create a composite policy index in our empirical work. This pol-
icy index, called “Policy,” is simply deﬁned as the sum of the number of res-
olution measures taken to restore ﬁnancial stability in the country. The
three resolution measures considered include the provision of guarantees,
liquidity support, and the setup of a public asset management company.
The Policy variable thus ranges from zero to three. Table 6.5shows the value
for the Policy variable for the eight crisis countries.
As company-speciﬁc control variables, we use each corporation’s initial
leverage ratio (measured as total debt-asset ratio), initial debt composition
14. The simple correlation between “liquidity support” and “guarantees” is 49 percent, be-
tween “liquidity support” and “public AMC [asset management corporation]” 47 percent, and
between “guarantees” and “public AMC” 49 percent.(measured as ratio of short-term debt to total debt), size (measured as the
natural logarithm of sales), and use of trade debt (measured as ratio of
payables to assets). To control for any sectoral diﬀerences across ﬁrms, we
use industry dummies (based upon two-digit Standard Industrial Classiﬁ-
cation codes) in the regressions.
Using these variables, we aim to answer the following questions. What are
the eﬀects of the announcement of these policies during the containment
phase on ﬁrm performance and sustainability? Does the implementation of
the set of resolution measures during the resolution phase of a crisis aﬀect
the speed of ﬁrm recovery? In addition to the resolution policies themselves,
we also want to assess how certain ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors inﬂuence both the
speed and the sustainability of the recovery of the corporate sector.
We use the following speciﬁc model to explain the depth of the crisis, as

































  (precrisis), (Policy index, initial ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables 
[precrisis], industry dummies).
We  use ﬁrst diﬀerences, rather than percentage changes, because the
EBITDA-sales ratio can take on nonpositive values. Given that the model is
speciﬁed in ﬁrst diﬀerences, and because we also control already for many
ﬁrm speciﬁcs, we can ignore any ﬁxed ﬁrm eﬀects. With the Policy index vari-
able being our main focus, we also ignore any other changes in the macro en-
vironment. We therefore assume that, conditional on a crisis taking place,
the eﬀect of the implementation of the crisis resolution measures dominates
170 Stijn Claessens, Daniela Klingebiel, and Luc Laeven










Source: Honohan and Klingebiel (2002); authors’ calculations from table 6.4.
Notes: The policy index is deﬁned as the sum of the number of resolution measures taken to re-
store ﬁnancial stability in the country. The three resolution measures considered include the pro-
vision of guarantees, liquidity, support, and the setup of a public asset management company.all other changes in country-speciﬁc eﬀects. Although we include industry
dummies in all regressions, these are not reported. In terms of ﬁrm speciﬁcs,
we expect that larger ﬁrms and ﬁrms with sounder debt structures suﬀer less
from a crisis. We further expect that trade debt may act as an important sub-
stitute for bank ﬁnancing during a crisis. Given that the number of observa-
tions per country diﬀer, we estimate equation (1) using both ordinary least
squares (OLS) and weighted least squares (WLS) with weights related to the
number of observations. All results are presented in table 6.6.
High ﬁrm proﬁtability at the onset of the crisis is found to be strongly cor-
related with the depth of the crisis. Our interpretation is that the proﬁtabil-
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Table 6.6 Depth of Crisis: EBITDA/Sales
Variable OLS (1) WLS (2)
Constant 0.112 0.224
(0.183) (0.199)












Adjusted R2 0.117 0.133
Durbin-Watson stat 1.99 2.06
N 603 603
Notes: Dependent variable is the difference between the EBITDA-sales ratio in the precrisis
year and the EBITDA-sales ratio in the crisis year. “Precrisis EBITDA-sales precrisis” is the ra-
tio of EBITDA to sales in the precrisis year. “Policy” is an index of policy measures directed to-
ward restoring ﬁnancial stability. It is the sum of three dummy variables. The ﬁrst dummy vari-
able takes value 1 if the government has issued an unlimited guarantee on bank liabilities, and
zero otherwise. The second dummy variable takes value 1 if the government has provided open-
ended liquidity support to ﬁnancial institutions, and zero otherwise. The third dummy variable
takes value 1 if the government has established a publicly owned, centrally managed asset man-
agement company, and zero otherwise. “Sales” is the natural logarithm of net sales in thousands
of U.S. dollars in the precrisis year. “Payables” is the ratio of payables to total assets in the pre-
crisis year. “Leverage” is the ratio of total debt to assets in the precrisis year. “Short-term debt”
is the ratio of short-term tot total debt in the precrisis year. We include industry dummies, but
these are not reported. We report heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors between brack-
ets. Equation (1) is estimated using ordinary least squares. Equation (2) is estimated using
weighted least squares with weights related to the number of country observations.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.ity of these ﬁrms rose to abnormally high levels until the onset of the crisis,
possibly as a result of a credit boom preceding the crisis, and shortly there-
after experienced a sharp decline during the credit crunch. Larger ﬁrms are
found to be less aﬀected by the crisis than smaller ﬁrms. This may be be-
cause larger ﬁrms were more diversiﬁed and could absorb the shocks better.
It could also be that banks renewed credit more easily for larger ﬁrms and
stopped rolling over credits for small and not-well-connected ﬁrms. We also
ﬁnd a sharper decline in corporate proﬁtability for ﬁrms with larger shares
of short-term debt, suggesting that such ﬁrms were aﬀected by the increases
in interest rates that occurred during the crisis period and were more ex-
posed to the risks of banks’ not renewing credit lines. Furthermore, the re-
gression results show that ﬁrms that depended more on trade debt were
more aﬀected. This suggests that ﬁrms themselves were also less willing to
oﬀer each other trade credit during a ﬁnancial crisis. This could be because
of a decreased ability of many debtors to repay the credit or, more generally,
because of uncertainty on the ﬁnancial health of ﬁrms. The ﬁndings on
short-term and trade debt together suggest that firms that had healthier
financing structures—lower debt-equity leverage and more long-term
debt—managed the crisis better.
We do not ﬁnd that the crisis resolution measures had any impact on re-
ducing the drop in proﬁtability in our sample of countries, as the coeﬃcient
on Policy is insigniﬁcant. One interpretation is that this set of crisis resolu-
tion measures is not suﬃcient or does not consist of the right type of mea-
sures to stop the downfall in corporate proﬁts. Another interpretation is
that these measures can only be implemented past the peak of a crisis, mak-
ing them ineﬀective to limit the decline. Either interpretation sheds doubt
on the common policy advice to adopt these measures quickly.
We use the same type of regression model to explain the (relative) recov-










































  (crisis), (Policy index, initial ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables (precrisis), 
industry dummies).
We again use ﬁrst diﬀerences because the EBITDA-sales ratio can take
on nonpositive values. Compared to equation (1), the main diﬀerence in the
regression setup is that we use the drop in ﬁrm proﬁtability (the dependent
variable in equation [1]) rather than the initial level of ﬁrm proﬁtability as
independent variable. This way we control for the possibility that prof-
itability recovers more for ﬁrms that are hit more during the initial stage of
the crisis. We estimate equation (2) again using both OLS and WLS, with
the results presented in table 6.7.
172 Stijn Claessens, Daniela Klingebiel, and Luc LaevenWe ﬁnd that the recovery of ﬁrm proﬁtability is strongly correlated with
the decline in ﬁrm proﬁtability during the initial stage of the crisis, suggest-
ing a large mean reversion in ﬁrm proﬁtability around the crisis period.
However, ﬁrm proﬁtability does not recover completely to its precrisis level,
which suggests that it may take more than one year to recover from a crisis
or that there is a permanent loss. The sharp recovery is in line with the re-
sults of Eichengreen and Rose (chap. 3 in this volume), Dooley and Verma
(chap. 5 in this volume), and Park and Lee (chap. 9 in this volume) that the
V-shaped recovery is the norm in currency crises. We also ﬁnd that the re-
covery of larger ﬁrms is slightly better than those of smaller ﬁrms, suggest-
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Table 6.7 Recovery from a Crisis: EBITDA/Sales
Variable OLS (1) WLS (2)
Constant –0.394** –0.293**
(0.157) (0.141)












Adjusted R2 0.459 0.541
Durbin-Watson stat 2.06 2.20
N 592 592
Notes: Dependent variable is the difference between the EBITDA-sales ratio in the postcrisis
year and the EBITDA-sales ratio in the crisis year. “EBITDA/sales drop” is the difference be-
tween the EBITDA-sales ratio in the precrisis year and the EBITDA-sales ratio in the crisis
year. “Policy” is an index of policy measures directed toward restoring ﬁnancial stability. It is
the sum of three dummy variables. The ﬁrst dummy variable takes value 1 if the government
has issued an unlimited guarantee on bank liabilities, and zero otherwise. The second dummy
variable takes value 1 if the government has provided open-ended liquidity support to ﬁnan-
cial institutions, and zero otherwise. The third dummy variable takes value 1 if the government
has established a publicly owned, centrally managed asset management company, and zero
otherwise. “Sales” is the natural logarithm of net sales in thousands of U.S. dollars in the pre-
crisis year. “Payables” is the ratio of payables to total assets in the precrisis year. “Leverage” is
the ratio of total debt to assets in the precrisis year. “Short-term debt” is the ratio of short-term
to total debt in the precrisis year. We include industry dummies, but these are not reported. We
report heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors between brackets. Equation (1) is esti-
mated using ordinary least squares. Equation (2) is estimated using weighted least squares with
weights related to the number of country observations.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.ing that larger ﬁrms may be in a better position to absorb shocks because
they are more diversiﬁed or because larger ﬁrms are politically better con-
nected than smaller ﬁrms.
The other ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables are generally not statistically signiﬁ-
cant, possibly because we already included ﬁrm-speciﬁc decline in prof-
itability in the regression, which has strong explanatory power. Surpris-
ingly, however, ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing structures do not appear to aﬀect recovery.
This may reﬂect some oﬀsetting eﬀects. On one hand, more risky ﬁnancing
structures should make it more diﬃcult for ﬁrms to obtain ﬁnancing to re-
sume their operations. On the other hand, there can be incentive eﬀects
from tighter ﬁnancing situations. It has been found, for example, for a
sample of U.S. ﬁrms that perform poorly for a year that higher predistress
leverage increases the probability of operational restructuring, thus accel-
erating recovery (Ofek 1993).
Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the policy index is strongly correlated with the re-
covery in ﬁrm proﬁtability. This suggests that the implementation of mea-
sures directed toward restoring the ﬁnancial health of banks, such as remov-
ing nonperforming loans from banks’ balance sheets, have a positive spillover
eﬀect toward ﬁrms by increasing banks’ ability to resume lending to more vi-
able ﬁrms, thus accelerating the recovery of ﬁrms. The quantitative impor-
tance of the policy variable is signiﬁcant. Firm proﬁtability would have in-
creased on average by around 10 percent if the country had implemented all
three crisis resolution measures considered.15 Of course, these are simulated
results for the average country, and actual results will diﬀer widely across
countries. In Sweden, many loans were removed from banks’ balance sheets,
and corporate-sector performance recovered relatively quickly. This also
happened in Indonesia, but the gains in corporate-sector performance, if any,
have been very limited so far, whereas the ﬁscal costs have been very large.
To assess the sustainability of the recovery, we investigate the factors in-
ﬂuencing the diﬀerence in corporate performance after the crisis and before
































  (precrisis), (Policy index, initial ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables [precrisis], 
industry dummies).
Equation (3) has the same explanatory variables as equation (1). The de-
pendent variable tries to measure the lasting impact of the crisis on ﬁrm
proﬁtability. If the dependent variable is small, that is, the ﬁrm’s proﬁtabil-
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15. The average increase of around 10 percent equals the regression coeﬃcient of the policy
index variable in equation (2) times three.Financial Restructuring in Banking and Corporate-Sector Crises 175
Table 6.8 Sustainability: EBITDA/Sales
Variable OLS (1) WLS (2)
Constant 0.095 –0.171
(0.168) (0.146)












Adjusted R2 0.306 0.202
Durbin-Watson stat 1.96 2.06
N 598 598
Notes: Dependent variable is the difference between the EBITDA-sales ratio in the postcrisis
year and the EBITDA-sales ratio in the precrisis year. “EBITDA/sales precrisis” is the
EBITDA-sales ratio in the precrisis year. “Policy” is an index of policy measures directed to-
ward restoring ﬁnancial stability. It is the sum of three dummy variables. The ﬁrst dummy vari-
able takes value 1 if the government has issued an unlimited guarantee on bank liabilities, and
zero otherwise. The second dummy variable takes value 1 if the government has provided open-
ended liquidity support to ﬁnancial institutions, and zero otherwise. The third dummy variable
takes value 1 if the government has established a publicly owned, centrally managed asset man-
agement company, and zero otherwise. “Sales” is the natural logarithm of net sales in thousands
of U.S. dollars in the precrisis year. “Payables” is the ratio of payables to total assets in the pre-
crisis year. “Leverage” is the ratio of total debt to assets in the precrisis year. “Short-term debt”
is the ratio of short-term to total debt in the precrisis year. We include industry dummies, but
these are not reported. We report heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors between brack-
ets. Equation (1) is estimated using ordinary least squares. Equation (2) is estimated using
weighted least squares with weights related to the number of country observations.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
ity has recovered to the level from before the crisis, then the recovery from
the crisis can be thought to be sustainable. The regression results are pre-
sented in table 6.8.
We ﬁnd that ﬁrms with high proﬁtability at the onset of the crisis do not
recover fully over the crisis period to precrisis levels of proﬁtability. This sug-
gests either that these ﬁrms had unsustainable levels of ﬁrm proﬁtability, pos-
sibly associated with a precrisis credit boom, or that it takes more than one
year for ﬁrms to recover fully from a systemic crisis. We also ﬁnd some evi-
dence that ﬁrms with relatively large amounts of short-term debt before the
crisis have greater diﬃculties in recovering to their precrisis levels of ﬁrm
proﬁtability, which possibly reﬂects diﬃculties in resolving their ﬁnancial
distress. The other, ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables are not statistically signiﬁcant.We ﬁnd that postcrisis levels of ﬁrm proﬁtability are closer to their pre-
crisis levels for ﬁrms in those countries that took (more) crisis resolution
measures. According to the regression results, the simultaneous implemen-
tation of all three policy measures under consideration would increase ﬁrm
proﬁtability by some 12 percentage points of sales.
The policy index, being a composite index, does not allow us to disen-
tangle the diﬀerent eﬀects of the three policy measures on changes in ﬁrm
proﬁtability.16Nevertheless, we speculate that our ﬁndings are the results of
two types of actions. The provision of liquidity support and the extension
of unlimited guarantees both restore conﬁdence in the ﬁnancial system and
indirectly help improve the performance of corporations. The establish-
ment of public asset management companies directly alleviates ﬁrms’ ﬁ-
nancial conditions by removing nonperforming loans of corporations from
banks and granting ﬁnancial relief. Of course, these measures come at (sub-
stantial) ﬁscal costs.
The regression results may suﬀer from a potential endogeneity problem
if the implementation of the crisis resolution measures is more likely in
countries with a deeper ﬁnancial crisis. In this case there would be reverse
causality between the dependent variable, “drop in EBITDA-sales,” and the
Policy index variable. We performed some tests for the existence of this
problem and did not ﬁnd evidence that would suggest a major endogeneity
problem in the regression results. Speciﬁcally, the policy index variable is
not signiﬁcantly correlated with the drop in EBITDA-sales between the
precrisis period and the crisis period (the dependent variable in equation
[1]), nor with the ﬁrms’ initial debt structures (as measured by the ratio of
debt to total assets or short-term debt to total debt in the precrisis period).17
Also, an ordered probit or logit model with the policy index as dependent
variable and the change in EBITDA-sales and debt structure indicators as
explanatory variables does not produce any signiﬁcant results. This sug-
gests that reverse causality is not a major problem.
As robustness on our dating of crises, we ran the same regressions in equa-
tions (1) and (2) with a diﬀerent crisis year, namely one year earlier than the
crisis years reported in table 6.2. We found results that are very similar to
those reported in tables 6.6 and 6.7. Again, we ﬁnd that crisis resolution
measures do not help to prevent the decline in ﬁrm proﬁtability during the
early stage of the crisis but are eﬀective (although costly) in terms of the re-
covery from a crisis. For ease of presentation we do not include these results.
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16. We noted earlier that such an exercise would produce highly unreliable results because
of the high correlation among the three policy measures and the limited number of countries
in the sample. We therefore do not make this eﬀort.
17. The correlation between the policy index variable and the diﬀerence in EBITDA-sales in
the precrisis period and the crisis period is only 3 percent; between the policy index variable
and the initial debt-assets ratio 14 percent (but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero); and be-
tween the policy index variable and the initial ratio of short-term debt to total debt 11 percent
(also not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero).6.5 Conclusions
The literature on systemic restructuring emphasizes the need for govern-
ments to actively intervene to overcome the many coordination problems in
a systemic crisis and to relieve the shortage of ﬁnancial capital, both of
which impede progress with case-by-case restructuring. The core issue in
dealing with a systemic crisis then becomes how to resolve coordination is-
sues while preserving or enhancing incentives for normal, market-based re-
structuring and transactions. Achieving both goals requires consistent gov-
ernment policies, among both issues and sectors, and over time.
The literature also stresses that ﬁscal and monetary policies have to sup-
port the recovery process in a systemic crisis. Policies must strike the right
balance between supporting the exchange rate and avoiding a serious credit
crunch created by high interest rates. Supportive policies also cover other
dimensions, such as the strictness of capital adequacy requirements and
whether an allowance should be made for automatic rollover of payments
by small and medium-sized enterprises during the early phases of a crisis.
As extensively debated in the context of the East Asian crisis and earlier (for
example, following Chile’s 1982 crisis), these supportive policies have not
always been in place during systemic crises.
Especially during the containment phase of a systemic crisis, but also af-
terward, governments have to balance achieving stability with aggravating
moral hazard. One dimension is avoiding the extension of government
guarantees of ﬁnancial institutions’ liabilities, which can create moral haz-
ard and reduce freedom in future loss allocations. Another dimension is the
closing or suspension of some ﬁnancial institutions. Although it signals a
certain supervisory stance and limits moral hazard, closing ﬁnancial insti-
tutions can inhibit the restoration of depositors’ conﬁdence. In some sys-
temic crises during which the institutional framework for bank resolution
was weak and there was much uncertainty among depositors and investors
on the intrinsic value of the banking system, closing banks without ad-
dressing the large problems in the ﬁnancial system aggravated the crises.
Consistent ﬁnancial reform involves, among other things, changes in
prudential regulation aﬀecting ﬁnancial institutions’ proﬁtability and the
availability of private capital. Capital adequacy requirements, for example,
need to be made consistent with current and future bank proﬁtability and
the availability of new private capital. Raising capital adequacy require-
ments during a systemic crisis is often not useful because capital is negative,
bank earnings are low or negative, and little or no new capital is available.
Consistent reform is also needed for public recapitalizations. Any public
recapitalization of banks must take into account the availability of ﬁscal
resources. In several crisis countries the recapitalization of ﬁnancial insti-
tutions with government bonds did not restore public conﬁdence because
limited ﬁscal resources were available to back the bonds. A related in-
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not address this issue directly in this chapter, but ex ante consistency is a
precondition for credibility.
Finally, approaches to restructuring must be consistent with a country’s
institutional capacity. Institutional deﬁciencies can rule out approaches in
some countries that may be best practices in other countries. These best
practices can include heavy reliance on a market-based approach to corpo-
rate restructuring, in which banks are recapitalized and asked to work out
debtors. Where corporate governance and ﬁnancial regulation and super-
vision are weak, however, such an approach may be a recipe for asset strip-
ping or looting rather than sustainable restructuring. Thus, emerging mar-
kets and industrial countries will need diﬀerent approaches to systemic
restructuring.
Although many of these lessons are often mentioned in the literature we
reviewed, best practice policies are often not applied. Mistakes can be made
in the middle of a crisis. Afterward, it is easy to point out these inconsis-
tencies. Even before, however, there have been many clear cases of incon-
sistent ﬁnancial restructuring programs. These inconsistencies usually de-
velop because policy makers are trying to overcome political constraints,
and it is hard to judge whether they do so in the most eﬃcient manner. How-
ever, inconsistencies can also reﬂect genuine diﬀerences of opinion among
policy makers and advisers on what constitutes best practice, as with the
need to guarantee all liabilities during the early stages of a crisis. The end
result is similar, in that consistency is often lacking.
Speciﬁc lessons from the empirical part of the paper reinforce some of the
general lessons and add new evidence to some that may be more controver-
sial. The analysis on data of corporate-sector performance suggests that a
package of government guarantees on bank liabilities, the provision of liq-
uidity support, and the setup of public asset management companies help
both the recovery and sustainability, but that these policies do not mitigate
the depth of the crisis. Although the empirical results suggest that measures
such as asset management companies can help in the short run, they may
not provide the right incentives for banks and ﬁrms to improve ﬁrm capital
structures in the long run. Moreover, for all measures there will be a trade
oﬀ: although they may speed up recovery, they have also been shown to in-
crease ﬁscal cost.
More generally, government eﬀorts to restructure need to take into ac-
count the political economy factors behind the causes of a crisis and its res-
olution. In this context there might be ways to change ownership structures
in a systemic crisis so that recovery is expedited and a more sustainable out-
come results. However, although we lack complete understanding of sys-
temic crises, we know even less about the political economy of systemic
crises.
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Comment Peter B. Kenen
As I have been asked to discuss a paper on a subject to which I have not
given a great deal of attention, my comments are those of an interested con-
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Peter B. Kenen is the Walker Professor of Economics and International Finance at Prince-
ton University.sumer rather than an expert critic. I trust that the authors will treat them
that way. Their paper has two parts; the ﬁrst surveys the literature, and the
second presents some new results. My comments, however, are in three
parts. The ﬁrst two track the authors’ own; the third raises an additional
question.
The Survey of the Literature
The compact survey in the ﬁrst part of the paper left me somewhat puz-
zled. It sets out several desiderata that should govern ﬁnancial and corpo-
rate restructuring and says that there may be trade-oﬀs between them, but
it does not tell us what to do when they come into conﬂict or cannot be sat-
isﬁed. This is not the authors’ fault; it resides in the nature of the problem
at issue. Let me oﬀer some illustrations that raise intriguing questions.
At several points, the authors emphasize the need for private-sector in-
centives to facilitate restructuring and minimize direct public-sector in-
volvement. Here is one example:
Successful corporate debt workouts require proper incentives for banks
and borrowers to come to the negotiating table....  T h e  i n c e n t i v e  f r ame-
work  for banks includes accounting, classiﬁcation, and provisioning
rules . . . [It] also includes laws and prudential regulations. Regulators
should ensure that undercapitalized ﬁnancial institutions are properly
disciplined and closed. The insolvency system should enable ﬁnancial in-
stitutions to enforce their claims on corporations, . . . and provide for the
eﬃcient liquidation of enterprises that cannot be rehabilitated.
However, what if the various rules and systems are inadequate? It may be
possible to design and introduce better systems rapidly, but the paper men-
tions recent cases in which it has taken too long—and in which the new sys-
tems have not worked well, partly because of the time required to recruit
and train the people needed to make those systems work well. The authors
assert that a crisis can be a good way to get diﬃcult reforms accepted, but
their own examples raise questions about that. Finally, it can take a great
deal of time for banks and other creditors to enforce their claims against
corporate debtors, and this raises another diﬃcult issue.
The authors stress the need for quick and decisive action to rehabilitate
the banking system, so as to avoid repeated, inadequate recapitalizations
that prove in the end to be more expensive and less eﬀective than a single
comprehensive eﬀort. The rapid rehabilitation of the banking system is in-
deed essential for the early and orderly rehabilitation of the corporate sec-
tor. Is that possible, however, if one must wait for the banks themselves to
enforce their own claims on the corporate sector and discover through that
process how large their own losses will be? Without knowing the true size of
the banks’ losses, it may be very hard to achieve a rapid, comprehensive re-
capitalization of the banking system.
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porate sector. An asset management corporation (AMC) puts the govern-
ment in charge. The rapid capitalization of the banking system puts the
private sector in charge. All other things being equal, most of us would pre-
sumably prefer to put the private sector in charge. In many cases, however,
all other things are not equal. Or, to put it diﬀerently, they are equally un-
satisfactory. There are incestuous relationships between the public and
private sectors and within the private sector. Under these second-best con-
ditions, the AMC approach has much to recommend it, especially if the
AMC is also empowered to enforce expeditiously its own claims on the cor-
porate sector by recourse to special arrangements that bypass unsatisfac-
tory bankruptcy regimes. That may be the best way to clean up the banks’
balance sheets quickly. There is merit, moreover, in the authors’ suggestion
that several AMCs be established under public ownership but under private
management. Incentives built into the contracts with the private managers
may be the most promising way to circumvent the incestuous relationships
that could otherwise corrupt the AMCs’ dealings with the banking and cor-
porate sectors. Nevertheless, governments may be reluctant to give privately
managed AMCs the special powers they may need to enforce their claims
quickly.
Consider, ﬁnally, the authors’ discussion of liquidity support and com-
prehensive guarantees of bank liabilities. Here again there is need to take
account of the second-best situation in a particular country. It is, of course,
better to have deposit insurance in place before the onset of a crisis. When
there is no such system in place, however, ad hoc guarantees may be un-
avoidable. If the monetary authorities ﬁnd it diﬃcult to distinguish between
illiquid and insolvent banks, they cannot expect depositors to do that. It is,
I think, inappropriate to test the eﬃcacy of guarantees by asking, as the pa-
per does, whether they help to minimize distress in the corporate sector. The
eﬃcacy of such guarantees must be judged on a case-by-case basis, by ask-
ing what would have happened to the banking system if they had they not
been used. How much more liquidity support would have been required?
How much money would have crossed the foreign exchange market, caus-
ing a precipitous depreciation and worsening the plight of banks and ﬁrms
with large foreign-currency debts?
The Regression Analysis
The point I have just made, about testing the eﬃcacy of guarantees by
looking for their impact on the corporate sector, leads me directly to the sec-
ond part of the paper, which contains the authors’ empirical work. For the
reason already mentioned, I was not especially surprised to ﬁnd that guar-
antees have no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the plight of the corporate sector. I
was somewhat surprised, however, to ﬁnd that liquidity support had a sig-
niﬁcantly positive eﬀect on the sustainability of corporate recovery, mea-
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ﬁnd that liquidity support and the use of AMCs had statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀects in several of the authors’ regression equations.
Nevertheless, I have misgivings about those regression equations, be-
cause they depend so heavily on the use of dummy variables that vary across
countries but not across ﬁrms. A single ﬁrm-speciﬁc variable, leverage, ap-
pears in tables 6.5 and 6.6 but is not statistically signiﬁcant. The same vari-
able appears in table 6.7 and is signiﬁcant, but it is interacted there with two
dummy variables, and there is no ﬁrm-speciﬁc variable in table 6.8. That last
table, moreover, has no signiﬁcant right-hand-side variable whatsoever—
which leads me to make a suggestion. Because the use of the change in the
debt-to-asset ratio did not yield any signiﬁcant results in table 6.8, should
the precrisis level of that same ratio be used as the only ﬁrm-speciﬁc ex-
planatory variable in tables 6.5 and 6.6? It has no explanatory power in ei-
ther table, save when interacted with a dummy variable, and its distribution
in ﬁgure 6.4is oddly diﬀerent from those of the other ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables.
Might it be better, then, to use the precrisis level of the interest-coverage ra-
tio, not that of the debt-to-asset ratio, as the ﬁrm-speciﬁc proxy for leverage
in tables 6.5 and 6.6?
Let me make one more suggestion, reﬂecting my misgivings about the use
of country-speciﬁc dummy variables to explain ﬁrm-speciﬁc outcomes. It
might be useful to ask whether the same dummy variables (or the policies
for which they stand) help to explain the cross-country diﬀerences in the
country means of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc data shown in table 6.3. There would ap-
pear to be big diﬀerences in the levels and changes of those means, but the
authors have not sought to exploit them.
Going One Step Further
Let me conclude by raising a question that is not discussed in the paper.
The authors may be right to say that crises help to foster the acceptance of far-
reaching structural reforms. Acceptance, however, is not suﬃcient. Imple-
mentation is crucial, and that is a time-consuming process—a point that the
authors readily acknowledge. Thus far, however, the international commu-
nity has failed to devise a menu of carrots and sticks designed to foster crisis-
preventive ﬁnancial reform in emerging-market countries. There are, by now,
some sixty codes and standards aimed at describing best practice in the ﬁ-
nancial and corporate sectors, and several oﬃcial bodies, including the Fi-
nancial Stability Forum, have looked at ways of encouraging emerging-
market countries to adopt those practices. Unfortunately, these bodies have
come up empty-handed. There was talk of using the Core Principles for
Banking Supervision to ﬁne-tune the new version of the Basel capital-
adequacy rules, but that was not done. The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) has said that it will use adherence to a “critical mass” of codes and
standards to judge a country’s eligibility for a Contingent Credit Line, but
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to have decided that the private sector should apply the carrots and sticks—
that it should reward compliance with key codes and standards by grant-
ing market access and should punish noncompliance by withholding mar-
ket access.
That approach, however, runs up against a serious practical problem. I
said before that the various codes and standards aim at deﬁning best prac-
tice rather than minimally acceptable practice. Therefore, emerging-market
countries insist on being judged and rewarded for the progress they have
made, not by the extent to which they comply with the principal codes and
standards. For their part, however, market participants have little interest in
progress; they are concerned with observable compliance—and rightly so
from their standpoint. We have therefore reached something of an impasse.
The oﬃcial community continues to insist that emerging-market countries
undertake far-reaching structural reforms in the ﬁnancial and corporate
sectors but has done little to encourage reform. It has passed the buck to the
private sector, which has neither the resources nor the incentives to oversee
the long process of structural reform. As a result, the reform process has
lagged badly in some countries and has barely begun in others. We may have
to wait for the next crisis—not because it is a propitious time for reform but
because it is the only feasible time. If that is so, however, the cost of delay
will be paid inevitably as part of the cost of the next round of crises.
Discussion Summary
Joshua Aizenman pointed to the political economy considerations of guar-
antees and argued that structural reforms may not start at all in the absence
of guarantees.
Martin Feldsteinmade a reference to the almost complete nationalization
of Korean banks and, with respect to the issue of reprivatization, pointed
to the problem of ﬁnding buyers while at the same time maintaining do-
mestic ownership.
Vincent Reinhart remarked that the optimal choice of a restructuring ve-
hicle depends on the pace of the ongoing “looting.” He emphasized the im-
portance of the separation of the banking and the corporate sector and the
risk of a crisis spreading from the ﬁrst sector to the latter. With respect to
the empirical part of the paper, he asked whether the issue of survivor bias
was accounted for.
Morris Goldsteinremarked that it seems useful to have a task force (a “ﬁre
team”) ready for immediate assistance with crisis assessment and manage-
ment. This might prevent the blanket guarantees typically issued during the
chaotic period immediately following the attack.
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mean a crisis in a country that is suﬃciently large and important to threaten
the entire global ﬁnancial system. This paper needs to be clear that it is us-
ing systemic in another sense.
Edwin M. Truman recommended that the authors take into account the
large part of the economies being aﬀected by crises. In particular, he added,
if a large fraction of an economy is involved in a crisis, there are very few do-
mestic investors capable of and willing to buy ﬁnancial-sector assets. He
also recommended that the authors include Japan in the sample.
Yung Chul Parkremarked that Korea had made several contacts with the
International Monetary Fund prior to the crisis.
Nouriel Roubini remarked that there are essentially only two possible so-
lutions—either to oﬀer a guarantee to depositors or to let the depositors
bear the cost—and that, either way, the taxpayers will end up paying.
Martin Eichenbaum noted that part of the problem lies in smaller bank-
ing systems’ being more likely to become subject to shocks.
Michael M. Hutchison made a reference to the Swedish banking crisis
and noted how quickly a political consensus was reached for resolving the
crisis. He argued that a prerequisite for the quick rescue in the case of Swe-
den is found in transparency and the separation of public and private sec-
tor. He asked if the regressions presented in the paper would be able to pick
up such cross-country diﬀerences.
Michael P. Dooley remarked that an important implication of third-
generation crisis models is that crises resolve nothing, an implication sup-
ported by the current paper, whereas policy changes are required in order
to achieve lasting improvements.
Stijn Claessens argued that blanket guarantees are not always necessary
and that it is possible to protect certain parts of the ﬁnancial sector through
more selective guarantees. He added that regardless of whether guarantees
were used the same pattern of recoveries was observed in the data. He ac-
knowledged the issue of limited demand for assets among foreign investors
and the preference for selling assets to domestic buyers. He also agreed that
the econometric analysis needs to control for survivor bias. In response to
Truman, he remarked that Japan was not included in the data set due to un-
certainty regarding the timing (start and end) of the Japanese crisis.
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